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Background of the Problem 
Many recent reports have shown concern with the conditions of education in the 
Middle East and have urged Middle Eastern countries to start serious reforms. For 
example, the World Bank MENA development report entitled The road not travelled: 
Education reform in the Middle East and North Africa (2007) urged Middle Eastern 
countries to initiate education reforms to make their curricula up to date and to prepare 
people for the challenges of the future. The report called for local, regional, and 
international initiatives to focus on producing education systems that have better returns 
for their investment in the region. Similarly, articles, studies, and reports in the United 
States have been describing education in the Middle East as in dire need of reform. For 
example, the United States Congress issued a resolution demanding that the White House 
pressure Saudi Arabia to reform their educational systems (U.S. Congress House. Res. 
275, 2005). People in the Middle East have also long recognized the need for education 
reform, although not enough efforts have been made to initiate effective reforms (Ben-
Meir, 2006; Ridha, 2006).  
Interest in Middle Eastern education greatly intensified in the wake of the attacks 
of September 11, 2001 as fingers started pointing at education in the Middle East as being 
part of the ideological preparation of the attackers (Rabasha et al., 2004; Looney, 2005;
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Kaplan, 2005, Ridha, 2006; El-Amine, 2005). This growing interest is evidenced in the 
number of newspaper and journal articles criticizing education in the Middle East and 
mostly indicating its role in promoting extremism (e.g. Friedman, 2001; Friedman, 2002; 
Rugh, 2002; Raphaeli, 2005; Ben-Meir, 2006).  
On a more official level, these concerns have been reflected in initiatives the 
United States and the Group 8 countries have launched to create reforms in the Middle 
East. The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) launched by the United States 
Department of State in December, 2002, and the Broader Middle East and North Africa 
(BMENA) initiative launched by the Group 8 countries in 2004 both included education 
as a main component. The countries targeted for reform under the MEPI initiative 
included: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, the West Bank and Gaza 
(Palestine), and Yemen. (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005). MEPI’s goal 
was to promote development in four key areas. According to the MEPI’s website 
www.mepi.state.gov  the initiative focused on four areas needing reform calling each area 
a “pillar.” These pillars included political, educational, economic, and women’s issues. 
On the education pillar MEPI has three goal areas; access, quality, and skill development. 
The main goal in education is to help people in the Middle East get better opportunities in 
life through getting access to education, through improving the quality of education to 
meet the demands of the current age, and through preparing the people for potential j bs 
by giving them the necessary training in skills needed in job markets.   
Like MEPI, BMENA emphasized the need for education reform in the Middle 
East, urged Middle Eastern countries to start serious reforms, and promised to support 
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any reform efforts. The goals of the educational part of this initiative included improving 
the quality and relevance of education through the following measures: encouraging 
independent and critical thinking, providing cost-effective education that is able to adapt 
to the local needs and circumstances in each country, and involving the community in 
planning and evaluating the outcomes of education. In the area of literacy, the goal was to 
enhance the resources especially for women and to encourage involving non-
governmental organizations in literacy efforts (Schools Interoperability Framework 
Association [SIFI], 2006). The United States helps with funding projects through 
BMENA as well.  
Many politicians in the United States believe that education reform will support 
the war on terrorism. In the hearing called by the Senate Foreign Affairs committee on 
April 15, 2005, Elizabeth Cheney, then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near Eastern affairs and director of the MEPI, referred to MEPI and BMENA initiatives 
as instrumental tools in the war against terrorism and made special referenc  to the role 
of education in combating terrorism (Cheney, E. April, 2006).  
While the different initiatives, programs and recommendations from reports were 
discussed and agreed on with Middle Eastern leadership, the U.S. Congress in 2005 tried 
to apply more pressure on the White House to take stronger measures towards Middle 
Eastern countries, especially Saudi Arabia, to change their curriculum. In a resolution 
from the subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, it was demanded that Saudi 
Arabia change its curriculum by focusing on tolerance and reducing the influ nce of the 
fundamentalist Wahhabi sect of Islam on the curriculum (U.S. Congress, 2005). The 
resolution described the Saudi curriculum as one promoting and fostering extremism, 
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ignorance and anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. Although the measure to consider 
these “violations” when assessing the US relations with Saudi Arabia was not passed by 
the Senates, it shows a “hostile congressional attitude towards Saudi Arabia” (Dumke, 
2006, p.89).  
Reactions to reform initiatives in the Middle East have been mixed, with a 
majority of the public being skeptical about Western-led initiatives (Looney, 2005; Ben-
meire, 2006; Alsoudi, 2006; Ridha, 2006; Modhesh, 2008). Alsoudi (2006) explains the 
difference between the target countries’ leadership and the public in terms of esp nse to 
the initiatives. While the leadership of the target countries welcomed the initiative, a 
majority of the people remained skeptical. Some voices in the Middle East have called 
the initiative too little to create real reforms in the region and have argued that it was a 
mere “instrument for furthering US foreign policy goals” (p. 16).   
Problem Statement 
With the increasing western interest in education and demands for education 
reform in the Middle East, there is a parallel resistance to any Western initiative among 
Middle Easterners. At the same time, there is a lack of research soliciting the views and 
opinions of stakeholders in the Middle East on the need for education reform (El-Amine, 
2005; Ridha, 2006). Besides, while the voices of some stakeholders such as religious 
leaders and government officials are clearly and visibly represented in public forums, 
Friday religious sermons, and television shows (e.g. Al-Jazeera’s interviews with Dr. 
Tareq Swidan, 2001, and Dr. Qaradawy, 2003), the voices of educators are hardly 
represented. The problem of education and the issues of education reform have been 
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captured by religious figures and journalists. Educators’ views on education reform and 
their attitudes toward reform initiatives have not been heard.  
Even though some books and articles in American journals have attempted to 
analyze the Middle Eastern public’s resistance to reform initiatives, th y based their 
analyses mainly or solely on the opinions of newspaper journalists and the views of 
religious leaders (e.g. Friedman, 2001, 2002, 2005; Ottaway, 2003; Ben-Meir, 2006). 
Middle Eastern educators, university professors, school teachers, and inspectors, are the 
ones who are directly involved with education at the grassroots level and so their voices 
need to be heard. This study is designed to do that.  
Since each country in the Middle East is unique in terms of economy, politics, 
history, culture, experiences with the West, etc. (Akkari, 2004), studies need to focus on 
countries individually and to avoid overgeneralization and homogenization (Gerges, 
2006; Moussalli, 2008). In terms of economic and demographic indicators, some 
countries in the Middle East such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait are rich, while 
others, such as Yemen and Sudan are rather underdeveloped and poor. Some are 
overpopulated, such as Egypt, while others are scarcely populated such as Oman and 
Libya (Abdallah, 2001). But most important here is the difference among Middle East rn 
countries in their experiences with the West and in their cultural and religious conditions. 
In these regards, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen cannot be compared to 
countries like Lebanon and Egypt. Cultural experiences, social beliefs and expectations, 
traditions, religiosity, tribal laws, education and even past experiences with the West are 
different.  
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The Middle East region has been referred to as a heterogeneous region by 
researchers and strategic writers since the 1960s. For example Hurewitz (1969) wrote that 
the differences in experiences with the West and the different ideologies in the Middle 
East make it imperative that Westerners approaching the region not use their 
understanding of one country as the basis for judging or predicting what other countries 
might do. For example, Hurewitz argues that the way the former U.S.S.R. was viewed in 
different countries in the Middle East was unexpected by some Americans who though  
that because Communist ideologies clashed with monotheism, Middle Easterners would 
reject Communism (p.10). The fact that some Middle Eastern countries embraced 
Communism while others rejected it shows the heterogeneity of the cultural experiences 
in the region. The wave of pan-Arabism, a secular socialist movement pioneered by th  
nationalist pan-Arab leader Gamal Abdul-Nasir-Nasser, was welcomed as an anti-
colonial, anti-Zionist ideology in many of the Arab countries such as Iraq, Syria, and 
Egypt, but it was strongly rejected by other countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
(Black, 2007).  
In terms of social expectations, traditions, and the role of women in the society, 
there are major differences among countries in the Middle East. While, for example, 
women in Saudi Arabia have to cover the entire body and their faces must be veiled, in 
Lebanon women participate in fashion shows and dress in Western style (Hammond, 
2005). The same is true about women’s role in public life. In the ultra-conservative Sudi 
Arabia, women are not allowed to vote, drive or travel alone (Nazir & Tomppert, 2005). 
Compared to Saudi Arabia, other countries in the region have varying levels of women’s 
participation and respect for women’s rights. Tunisia and Morocco are at the top of the 
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list in terms of respect for women’s rights and the involvement of women in public life. 
Countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan scored significantly higher than Persia 
Gulf countries in Nazir & Tomppert’s  measures of women’s rights (2005). In the Persian 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, the poorest country, Yemen, had the highest level of 
women’s participation mainly due to women’s active involvement in running Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and their involvement in political  parties.  
Differences between Middle Eastern countries also include economic, 
educational, political, and past experience differences. Therefore, a careful study should 
either focus on one country at a time or study the whole region with an awareness of the 
differences, so as not to over-generalize for the entire region. It is for this reason that this 
study focuses on Yemen. Although findings from the study can be interpreted in lightof 
the events and general tone in the Middle East, it should be noted that it is only within a 
Yemeni context that the data was collected and thus interpretations of the findings should 
be confined to that context. Comparative case studies could be conducted as further 
research to build a better understanding of the region. It should also be noted that the 
education reform referred to in this study indicates only education reform in public
schools from Kindergarten to the 12th grade (K-12). In Yemen as well as in many other 
Middle Eastern countries, the curriculum for K-12 schools is a national curriculum 
mandated, outlined, written, and planned by central committees in the Ministries of 
Education.   
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is twofold. It aims at discovering the views of Yemeni 
educators about the need for education reform in the Middle East, and 2) their attitudes 
 8
toward curriculum reform demands coming from Western countries. The study will also 
examine the impact of variables that influence educators’ views on the current cu riculum 
and attitudes toward education reform initiatives, such as their age, their highest 
academic degree, their previous contact with people from other countries or cultures, and 
their religiosity.  
Research Questions 
The study will attempt to answer the following research questions: 
1. What are the views of Yemeni educators on the current curriculum in their country?  
2. How do Yemeni educators view Western initiatives and demands that 
involve/encourage educational reform?  
3. What variables correlate with the views on the need for education reform and the 
attitudes toward reform initiatives? More specifically: 
a) How do age, gender, and income relate to the attitudes of educators toward reform 
initiatives? 
b) How does religiosity (personal piety, support for political Islam) relate to the 
attitudes of educators toward reform initiatives? 
c) How does the number of years spent abroad relate to the attitudes of educators 
toward reform initiatives? 
d) How does the highest degree obtained relate to the attitudes of educators toward 
reform initiatives? 
e) How does the view about the need for curriculum reform relate to the attitudes of 
educators toward reform initiatives? 
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Significance of the Study 
With the increased attention to the Middle East, Americans and Europeans are 
relying on different sources for information about the region. Of particular interest to the 
average Western person is the question expressed by many scholars, politicians and 
ordinary men and women; “why do they hate us?” The need to get closer to the mentality 
of Middle Eastern people and to understand their attitudes towards the West - and most 
importantly, the sources of these attitudes-have haunted people in the West. Since the 
tragic attacks of 9/11 drew more attention to education in Muslim Middle Eastern 
countries as one of the culprits in bringing up youth with Anti-western attitudes, looking 
at the educational system and educators’ attitudes will inform interested people ab ut 
education as a potential source of ideological mobilization of Muslims.  
Research on the attitudes of Middle Eastern people needs to take into account the 
fact that each country is different. Therefore, input taken from one country need not be 
generalized to other countries or used to depict what Ahmed Moussalli (2008) describes 
in his book U.S. foreign policy and Islamist politics a  the idea of a “global … enemy” (p. 
167). Doing so, Moussalli argues, reduces the likelihood of understanding the way 
religion works in the Middle Eastern societies. Therefore, this study focuses on one 
country, Yemen, and attempts to understand the views and attitudes of educators in this 
country toward a specific educational issue.  
Theoretical Framework 
This study is situated within a body of research that study the cultural politics f 
education (Pennycook, 1990) and the inevitability of the influence of globalization as a 
post-colonial political force on education in third world countries (Tikly, 2004). Given 
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the post-9/11 focus on religion in relation to education and international conflict, and 
since this study seeks to find out what factors are related to Yemeni educators’ views and 
attitudes toward post-9/11 Western reform initiatives, it also relies on a theore ical base 
provided by political science professor Mark Tessler (2002) according to which two types 
of religiosity influence Middle Easterners’ views on and attitudes toward Western ideals 
and ideas: personal and political religiosity. Personal religiosity refers to the personal 
commitment to the acts and rituals of worship, while political religiosity refers to the 
support for a political role for religion in governing public’s life (Benson & Williams, 
1982; Tessler, 2002). According to Tessler, Performing the obligatory prayers five times 
a day, reading the Quran regularly, and basing important life decisions on religious 
teachings are all indicators of personal religiosity. Indicators of political religiosity 
include supporting more political involvement for the religious institutions and figures, 
believing that religious figures should influence people’s political orientations and 
choices, and favoring religious laws over democratic laws.  
While some American writers such as Thomas Friedman (2005) and others argue 
that Islam as a religion in its totality, and the Quran in particular, is responsible for 
Middle Easterners’ views on and attitudes toward the West, Tessler (2002) found that 
only political religiosity was relevant to the attitudes toward democracy. Personal 
religiosity, including reading the Quran, did not influence Middle Easterners’ vi ws on or 
attitudes toward democracy. This study utilized Tessler’s distinction between personal 
and political religiosity in attempting to understand the relationship between various 
factors, including religiosity, and the attitudes of Yemeni educators toward Western 
educational reform initiatives.   
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Limitations of the study 
Due to the distance between the researcher and the research site, direct contact 
with participants was not available and so the researcher was not able to answer questions 
from participants. However, the information sheet (see Appendix A) distributed with 
each survey included the researcher’s contact information and encouraged participants to 
send any questions by e-mail. Another limitation to this study is in the nature of th  data 
collection method, i.e. the use of anonymous survey questionnaires with Likert scale 
questions. Likert scale questions limit the respondents’ ability to go beyond a stand rd set 
of responses (Babbie, 1995). In order to counter the potential limiting effect of the Likert 
scale type of questions, the researcher provided participants with an opportunity to add 
their remarks or any additional thoughts below each of the key items in the questionnaire. 
The anonymity of responses made it impossible for the researcher to make any follow-up 
with the participants. Given the usual low return rates in survey research in social stud es 
(Johnson & Owens, n.d), follow-up calls increase the possibility of convincing 
questionnaire recipients to participate and inform the study by analyzing the reasons that 
prevented non-respondents from responding (Groves, Dillman, Eltinge, & Little, 2002).  
Definition of Terms 
 Some of the terms used in this study are either culture-specific or descriptions of 
jobs that exist in the educational or administrative systems in Yemen. Following are some 
of the terms used in the study: 
• Imam: a term meaning a religious leader, it has been used to refer to the poliical 
dynasty of the king in Yemen during the Zaydi reign from the 9th century to 1962.  
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• Imamate (Arabic Imamah): leadership of the nation of believers; a doctrine the 
Shiite Muslims believe to be the right of certain people who serve as guides for 
the nation and are associated with the household of the Prophet.  
• Inspector/education supervisor: almost equivalent to a master teacher in the 
American schools, except that education supervisors in Yemen are assigned to 
school districts and among their job duties are serving as subject-matter experts, 
supervising and evaluating teachers, and providing training as needed. 
• Mujahideen (variation Mujahidin): Plural of Mujahid, linguistically the word 
means strugglers, but it has been used heavily to refer to the Muslim fighters in 
Afghanistan during the war with the former U.S.S.R. It is erroneously translated 
as “worriers of God,” while, “technically the term does not have a necessary 
connection with war” (Esposito, 2003, p. 213).  
• Shari’a law: religious doctrines mandating rules and regulations based on the 
Quran and traditions of the Prophet of Islam.  
• Wahhabi(sm): a Saudi-based strict sect of Islam following the teachings of Sheikh 
Mohammed Ibn Abdulwahab (1703-1792), an 18th century reformist and reviver 
of the teachings of Islam. Followers of Wahhabism are called Wahhabi and are 
known for emphasizing the role of knowledge in confronting nonbelievers. 
Sometimes they are associated with violent opposition of medieval practices 
associated with some cults in the region, such as glorifying shrines and tombs. For 
Wahhabis, the Shiite pilgrims to the Holy shrines in Karbala and Najaf in Iraq are 
acts of apostasy (Esposito, 2003).  
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• Zaydi: a moderate Shiite group established in northern Iran in 863 and lasted until 
the 12th century, but remained in power in North Yemen from 893 to 1962. The 
Zaydi Shiite are the closest to Sunni and they differ from other sects of Shiite 
mainly in their acceptance of the first, second, and third Caliph (Abu Bakr, Omar, 
and Othman) all after the death of Prophet Muhammed (Peace Be Upon Him) 
(Esposito, 2003, p. 346). 
Summary 
Chapter 1 provided a background of the problem, detailed the problem being 
researched, and outlined the research questions to be answered in subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 2 presented a synthesis of relevant prior studies and scholarly writings pertinent 
to the relationship between global forces and education in Third World countries. Chapter 
3 discussed the method used to answer each research question. Chapter 4 presented the 
results of the questionnaire and the findings from the study. Chapter 5 provided analyses, 
interpretations, and discussions of the findings from the study followed by 





REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
This study focused on the views of educators in the Middle East - Yemen in 
particular on the need for education reform and their attitudes toward Western initiatives 
and demands to reform education. This chapter provides a spectrum of the research and 
writings on education reform as relates to the topic of this study, moving from a gener l 
review of research on education reform within the context of globalization and the  
zooming in to the more specific area of education reform in the Middle East as a part of 
the efforts to create general reforms in the region. Attitudes of Middle East rners toward 
reform initiatives in general, and educational reform initiatives in particular are also 
presented in this chapter. The literature review is thus organized as follows: 1) education 
reform in a globalized world, 2) education reform in the Middle East, 3) reform initiat ves 
in the Middle East, 4) reactions of Middle Easterners to reform initiatives, 5) religiosity 
and attitudes toward the West, 6) the Arab Barometer, 7) the uniqueness of Yemen, 8) the 
significance of Yemen, and 9) conclusion.  
Education Reform in a Globalized World 
Education reform as defined by Tyack & Cuban (1995) refers to any “planned efforts to 
change schools in order to correct perceived social and educational problems”  (p.4).
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Reform usually comes as a response to changing societal demands and needs  
(Altenbaugh, 2003; Horn, 2002; Kaestle, 1990; Ravitch, 2000; Schlechty, 1990). In this 
sense, education reform is a political process that is tied to the interests of different forces 
with different perceptions of social problems. In order to succeed, education reform needs 
public support and thus needs to respond to the public’s voice. Among the public, the 
voice of teachers is particularly important. Therefore, Tyack and Cuban (1995) suggest 
that reforms initiated by teachers are guaranteed to succeed. Carolyn Woempner (2008) 
argues that the cyclic nature of education reform is “a reflection of cycles of public and 
institutional [including political] values and priorities” (p.23). 
In formerly colonized countries, the need for education reform was perceived as a 
form of resisting Western hegemony (Hopkin, 1982; Guthrie, 1986; Tikly, 2001). Writing 
about the ways in which formerly colonized countries reform their education systems, 
Guthrie (1986) asserts that such countries conduct education reform in order to become 
free from the chains of colonization and to emphasize their national identities. Among the 
goals of education reform in such countries also is the need to address their national 
priorities and change the focus of their education from what serves the interests of 
colonizers to what serves the interests of the country. But while trying to reform 
education for these purposes, Guthrie (1986) argues that developing countries usually 
resort to the recent “innovative reactions in the former colonizers’ own countries (p. 81).” 
Former colonizers also actively seek to maintain a status of power over the ideas and 
thought formation of youth in their former colonies by continuing to influence their 
education systems (Altbach, 1989; Nguyen, et al, 2009).  
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Fazal Rizvi (2004) examined how September 11 and its aftermath affected the 
discussion about globalization. He asserts that globalization has always been represented 
by a unidirectional cultural flow “from the West to the Rest” (p. 159) but in covert ways
that usually would consider forms of mutual cultural understandings and learning. The 
idea that globalization was simply a transformation of time and space, argues Rizvi 
(2004), concealed a “hegemonic project” (p.160) of capitalism. Until the end of the 1990s 
the discussion of globalization had been confined to the realms of economy and politics. 
But in the aftermath of September 11 the debate about globalization entered the field of 
academics and education. Security came to the forefront of international relations and the 
notion of nation-state, that had been assumed to start losing power with globalization 
regained strength because of the new concerns about the security of ‘citizens.’ Th  major 
change in the discourse of globalization has been the relationship between the West and 
Islam, which became more of a hostile one, thus impeding the promotion of global ideals 
that transcend time and space.  
Many recent studies have noticed that international agencies and Western 
countries have been promoting education reforms in developing countries by tying 
financial support and loans to reforms that represent Western views on education (e.g. 
Kamat, 2004; Tikly, 2004; Sayed, 2005; Resnik, 2006; Nguyen, Elliott, Terlouw, & Pilot, 
2009). Focusing on the introduction of collaborative learning into Asian schools, Nguyen 
et al. (2009) sought to find out how globalizing forces, in attempts to globalize education, 
rather force educational systems into homogeneity with Western ideals and cultural 
norms. The collaborative learning approach was found not to be in line with the local 
cultural beliefs and practices of Asian students and so encouraging or imposing it n 
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them ignores their unique cultural backgrounds. Nevertheless, when grants and loans are 
available only for such programs and ideas, developing countries feel pressured to accept 
them even though they do not necessarily prove productive or culturally appropriate.  
One of the key writers on issues of globalization and education in the postcolonial 
era is Leon Tikly. His conceptual framework, developed in a paper published in the 
Comparative Education Journal in 2001, provided the basis on which many later works 
on the issue built their arguments. Tikly (2001) sought to solidify the grounds on which 
studies on globalization and education are based. He refers to education in the 
postcolonial era as a form of building national identity for the formerly colonized 
countries. However, colonial education has three merits that Tikly acknowledges. The 
first is that it provided a base for structured education systems in the colonized countries 
on which education reforms were possible. The second is that colonial education started 
the economic, political, and cultural global flows and networks which contributed to the 
creation of the current education systems in these countries. The third point is that this 
form of flow of ideas helped in the efforts to be liberated from Western colonization. 
Western revolutionary ideologies were embraced in some colonized countries and served 
as the ideological underpinnings for liberation and self-reliance afterwards. Tanzania was 
the example of this use of Western ideologies to become free from Western hegemony. 
The Tanzanian president’s philosophy of self-reliance was translated into educational 
campaigns that helped the public ameliorate the conditions of illiteracy and poverty in the 
country.  
Colonial education consistently fell short of providing secondary and higher 
education that could have made a difference in the lives of colonized people (Tikly, 
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2001). Hegemony and the imposition of ideas and programs continued, in different 
forms, after the liberation of colonized countries despite the resistance of ewly liberated 
nations. Resistance took the forms of establishing countries’ own educational systems, 
rejecting the hegemony of the English language (Pennycook, 1990; Phillipson, 1992), and 
the reviving of national and tribal loyalties. In this way, the indigenous people are 
asserting their diversity and equity, which Tikly (2001) describes as essential t ets of 
democracy that are endangered by the attempts to globalize education.  
Postcolonial global forces sought to influence education in five ways, namely 
harmonization, dissemination, standardization, installing interdependence, and imposition 
(Dale, 1999). As a result of globalization, education policy in individual countries has 
been forced to become alike despite differences in cultural experiences. This 
harmonization mechanism has been demonstrated strongly in the European Union, in 
particular. The second mechanism of dissemination refers to the efforts of international 
agencies and umbrella organizations to set and communicate agendas to their 
beneficiaries or member states. Standardization is the mechanism through which the 
global forces set the principles and guidelines for member states to follow. The fourth 
mechanism is evident in the establishment of nongovernmental organizations that are tied
to global organizations and seek to make the world a connected network of causes. 
Imposition is the final mechanism, and the one that does not require persuasion or 
cooperation with the recipient countries which have to follow guidelines dictated by 
donors in order to keep receiving benefits and not be punished. The last mechanism is the 
one the public usually associate with globalization (Dale, 1999).  
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Kamat (2004) presents a different picture of local versus global education 
showing that trends like new nationalism are not in contradiction with globalization, but 
rather in conjunction with it. Studying education reform in India, she theorizes that the 
new Hindu nationalism is tied to globalization not a dissociated with it. She compares the 
anti-colonial nationalists’ goals with those of the new Hindu nationalists.’ Anti-colonial 
nationalists came right after India’s liberation and were led by Ghandi’s ideals that 
rejected colonialism, but acknowledged the need to reform the Indian society. Hindu 
nationalism represented in the education reform initiative in 2000 did not recognize the 
need to reform, but instead blamed modernization for the “collapse of a harmonious 
social order” (p. 274). Kamat also differentiates between territorial nationalism nd 
cultural nationalism. Territorial nationalism includes people from different cultural and 
religious backgrounds and, in the case of India, was progressive in nature, whereas 
cultural nationalism seeks to unite people from the same ethnic, religious, or sectarian 
backgrounds across territories. In this way, cultural nationalism goes against the 
principles of pluralistic societies. Reflecting on the goals of Hindu nationalism to render 
the world a Hindu nation, Kamat (2004) declares that this form of nationalism is not anti-
colonial but rather imperialistic itself, the only difference being that Hindu nationalists do 
not aspire to global power through territorial expansion and military and economic 
power, but rather through a cultural hegemony.  
Tabulawa (2009) studied Botswana’s education reform as a response to 
globalization. Acknowledging what Tikly (2001) termed as ‘policy borrowing,’ 
Tabulawa asserts that the relationship between the global and the local in educational 
policy making is a dialectical one. The final shape of educational policy influenced by 
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globalization is usually determined by local conditions and concerns. In the case of 
Botswana the Revised National Policy on Education (RNPE), established in 1994, aimed 
at producing the learner equivalent of the self-programmable worker, a concept that 
originated in the post-Fordist economic model. The self programmable learner is a 
learner who is innovative, creative, flexible, and an independent thinker. Tabulawa 
analyzed the new policy and found that the influence of the local preference of 
behaviorist modes of education did not help in producing the desired type of learner. The 
components of the policy itself were clearly influenced by local conditions and concerns 
and produced a contradictory set of programs that did not seem to achieve the goals of the 
policy.  
In the Middle East, even though only a few studies about education and 
globalization are reported, some studies have been made public in regional and local 
conferences that discussed globalization in one way or another. The conference 
‘Globalization and Educational Priorities,’ organized by King Saud University in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, in April 2004, provided some literature that represented the Arab voice on 
the issue of globalization and education. Views on the matter ranged from the view that 
education was being improved by global efforts and interactions that injected quality
enhancers into the educational systems of third world countries in general and the Midle 
East in particular (Hossani, 2004), to views that saw the effect of globalization on 
education as a new form of colonization and Western – particularly American domiation 
(Al-Torayry, 2004).  
Hossani (2004) acknowledged the impact of globalization on education and 
considered it a potentially positive one. Contact and mutual respect with the others are 
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inevitable with the new technologies and shared global interests. National educational 
systems in the Arab world cannot afford to be isolated from the rest of the world. And so, 
Hossani (p. 23) suggests that Arab countries lead “major reform efforts to review all the 
aspects of their education,” including purposes, goals, approaches, and content of the 
curriculum in a way that makes these systems compatible with the developments in the 
world. Without these reforms, the educational systems in the Arab world will remain 
backward and out of touch with the world. But at the same time, these systems should 
seek to fortify themselves by updating their cultural and value sources, i.e. revisiting and 
revising the Arabic and Islamic cultural bases of education. The end result of these efforts 
should be an educational system that copes with the changes in the globalized world but 
maintains its unique features that are based on the history and culture of the region. 
Al-Torayry (2004) on the other hand, presented the findings from a survey study 
he conducted with the students in King Saud University in Saudi Arabia. Students were 
asked to respond to survey questions by rating different descriptive statements of 
globalization. The highest rated concepts of globalization were “Islam could be an 
alternative for Western globalization if conditions permit,” “globalization is a new form 
of colonization,” “globalization is a vague concept,” “globalization has Western origin, 
philosophies, and mechanisms,” and “globalization is an equivalent of domination” (p. 
15). Thus, Al-Torayry concludes that the common concept in the Middle East is that 
globalization is a Western tool to dominate the rest of the world. People reject 
globalization because it ignores their rich backgrounds. He recommends that educational 
systems should fortify youth by challenging the global forces and bringing the best in the 
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Islamic culture and traditions to the attention of students at all times, so they are aware of 
the strengths in their heritage.  
In conclusion, the forces of globalization impact local education policies in the 
post-colonial, developing countries. This influence is usually uni-directional, with the 
West exporting ideas and practices to the rest of the world. Not all the stakeholders in the 
‘borrowing’/recipient countries view the Western impact on their education positively. 
Some educators and consumers of education even see globalization and the international 
interest in local education systems as an extension of colonialism (Al-Torayry, 2004; 
Mansour, 2007). However, when funding through grants and loans is tied to certain 
educational practices or reforms, these countries do follow Western models of education. 
In some cases, the results are not exactly what the developing countries aspir  to (e.g. 
Tabulawa, 2009), and in other cases the consequences could even be reactionary policies 
that dominate education reform efforts (e.g. Kamat, 2004).  
 
Education in the Middle East 
Historical background 
Byron Massialas and Samir Jarrar (1991) provided a full historical and analytical 
review of Arab education from the seventh century to the 1980s. According to Massialas 
and Jarrar, the history of education in the Middle East dates back to the seventh century 
with the beginning of the message of Islam. Mosques were built and used as learning 
centers where adults would get together and study the Quran. Later on, Muslim youth 
were also taught how to read and write the Quran in mosques, thus giving Muslim youth 
the first type of institutionalized education, called “Kuttab.” Kuttab means a mosque 
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where children are taught how to read and write (Massialas & Jarrar, p. 10). Interest in 
education among the early Muslims was evidenced in the Quran and the sayings of the 
prophet Muhammed. The first verse believed to be revealed in the Holy Quran reads 
“Read in the name of thy Lord and Cherisher who created […] who taught the use of the 
pen” (p. 8). Sayings of the prophet Muhammed as quoted in Massialas & Jarrar include
“seek education from cradle to grave” (p. 8), and “seek knowledge, even if it be in China,
for the pursuit of knowledge is obligatory for every Moslem, man or woman” (p. 9). 
Prisoners of war during the early days of Islam would be released if they taught en 
Muslims how to read and write. During the next centuries of the Muslim civilization, 
from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries, non-formal education in the Muslim world 
flourished and was further institutionalized in the form of Kuttabs and early forms of 
schools. It was not until the eleventh century that the first formal educational system was 
established and sponsored by the state. The first school was Al-Madrasa Al-Nizammiya 
in Baghdad. This madrasa (meaning school) taught humanities, philosophy, arts, 
mathematics, and physical sciences. Soon afterwards, Damascus followed with the 
establishment of 21 madrasas, followed by Cairo and then other cities in the Muslim 
world (p. 15). The main advantage of this early form of education was that it encouraged 
the pursuit of knowledge and the exchange of culture and ideas. Instructors and 
translators were brought from anywhere in the world and were well-paid.  
In the fourteenth century the Ottoman Empire took over the Arab Muslim Empire 
and the whole educational system changed. Madrasas were moved from the city centers 
of Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, etc. to new places with Istanbul, the capital city of the 
Ottoman Empire, hosting the major madrasas (Massialas & Jarrar, 1991, p. 17). The 
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content of the curriculum was also changed and cultural exchange with other 
philosophies was strictly prohibited. It was not until the 19th century that the first 
scholarly contact with the West was made in the form of scholarships for students in 
Egypt to study abroad. With the establishment of colleges of medicine and sciece, 
students were sent abroad to study. At the same time some missionary schoolshad been 
functioning in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Egypt.  
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the invasion of the Muslim Arab 
world by European colonization, new forms of education were established. The new 
schools were mainly geared towards serving the administrative needs of the c lonizers 
(Massialas & Jarrar, 1991). The curriculum lacked relevance to the students’ countries’ 
needs or their personal interests (Akkari, 2004). Massialas & Jarrar (1991) and Akkari 
assert that during this period access to education in the Arab colonies was very limit d, 
with quotas given to each area and a very selective process that excluded the majority of 
the locals. The curriculum was an adaption of the European curriculum with the addition 
of some Islamic religious teaching and Arabic lessons. Massialas & Jarrar commented 
that students would learn about “the history and geography of France [more] than … their
own country” (p. 20). The trend to make the youth in colonized countries learn about the 
colonizer’s strengths is among the mechanisms used to indoctrinate them to achieve
imperialist goals (Carnoy, 1974). Imperialism entails efforts to “influece and control 
other countries’ economies for the economic and political gain of the dominant power (p. 
26)” and education is used by the colonizers to achieve this goal. Awareness of 
imperialism among the people led to the emergence of social resentment and political
movements that struggled for national independence.  
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Prior to 1943, France controlled Syria and other regions of the former Ottoman 
Empire while Great Britain colonized the Empire comprised of what is currently Iraq, 
Palestine and TransJordan. The Arab states began gaining independence in the yars 
during and after World War II, with Syria being the first to gain independence from the 
French mandate in 1943. Other Arab countries were still under colonization. Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia were under the French colonization, while Libya was under Italian 
colonization until 1947, and then was under both the French and British colonization until 
1951. Saudi Arabia and North Yemen were not directly colonized by Europeans. 
However, South Yemen remained under the British colonization for 138 years, gaining its 
independence in 1963 and a full sovereignty in 1967 (Lewis, 2003; Dresch, 2000).  
Political independence was accompanied by independence in the educational 
systems. The new governments focused on quantitative measures of education reform to 
accommodate the population explosions, thus building scores of schools and learning 
centers. Up until the 1980s, the focus of education efforts was to increase the number of 
schools to provide access to as many of the Arab youth as possible and to establish a 
structure for the educational systems in these countries. As a result education in the 
Middle East has made significant progress over the past 50 years (World Bank, 2007, 
Benard, 2006). The World Bank’s 2007 report entitled he road not traveled: Education 
reform in the Middle East describes the progress of education systems in the Middle East 
in terms of the numbers of schools, enrollment rates, literacy rates, and spending on 
education in the Middle Eastern countries. However, the report highlights major 
challenges and areas that require serious efforts for reform. The need for r form, as 
identified by the World Bank, comes from the need of Arab Middle Eastern countries to 
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improve their return of investments on education, and to make sure education is preparing 
their youth for future challenges. According to the report, the educational achievement of 
the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries is significantly lower than that of 
countries with the same level of economic development. Although the percentage of per 
capita expenditure on education in the Middle East is higher than in other regions, the 
development outcomes of education are significantly lower than in other regions. 
Education attainment did not reduce poverty indicators. The report contends that it is not 
the economy or spending on education that affects the outcomes, but rather some 
characteristics of the educational system in question.  
Available recent research examined the current condition and predicted the future 
challenges of education in the Middle East(e.g. Akkari, 2004; Benard, 2006). Akkari 
(2004) began his study by stressing the fact that the educational past and preset 
conditions are different in each county and tried to concentrate on the educational issues 
that are common in all the Middle Eastern countries. In general, indicators of expenditure 
on education as a percentage of the GNP in the Middle Eastern countries are among the 
highest in the world. However, in terms of quality and international compatibility, M ddle 
Eastern education ranks rather low. High unemployment rates soaring up to 14% and 
higher, attest to the disconnect between the education system and the labor market needs 
(Akkari, 2004; Benard, 2006). The highest unemployment rate, as observed by Akkari 
was among the secondary vocational degree holders and the university graduates with 
women suffering the most from unemployment. Gender inequality in educational 
opportunities is more common in the poor countries of the region. For example, in Egypt, 
Morocco, and Yemen, female enrollment rates are significantly lower than those for 
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males. In Yemen, the gap in elementary school enrollment is four girls to ten b ys. The 
gap is three girls to ten boys in secondary schools. On the other hand, in rich countries 
such as Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar female enrollment is a bithigher than 
male enrollment in schools (World Bank, 2007). The differences among countries in the 
Middle East exist both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Enrollment rates in poorer 
countries are less than those in richer countries, gender disparity, and adult illiteracy rates 
are higher in poorer countries. Yemen, Morocco, and Egypt are always at the bottom of 
the list when it comes to the three measures of gender disparity, enrollment rates, and 
adult illiteracy (Akkari, 2004).  
Like Akkari, the director of RAND Initiative for Middle Eastern youth, Cheryl 
Benard, argues that investment in education has not yielded the anticipated and hoped for 
outcomes in social, economic, and political development in the Middle East (2006). The 
“impressive expansion in education” did not improve its quality nor did it contribute to 
the creation of a prosperous society (p. 31). Return on investment in education has been 
low and the skilled worker has not been produced. Benard’s conclusions about the need 
for educational reform in the Middle East include not only working on the quality of 
education but also considering the disconnect between education and the economy. She 
recommends that classrooms teach skills that prepare students to succeed in lif , but at 
the same time she insists that somehow there must be job opportunities that graduates 
find their skills have prepared them for.  
Education reform in the Middle East 
Given all the discontent with the status of education in the Middle East as shown 
above, it is important to present the debate about the needed education reform. In fact, the
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issue of reforms in the region is a complex one and involves many fronts - political, 
economic, educational, and even social. Middle Easterners have been calling for and 
attempting reforms for a long time, but at the same time stronger voices have been 
cautioning that the United States and the West in general are only pushing for their wn 
interests that do not necessarily address the needs and aspirations of the region (Sayed, 
2005; El-Amine, 2005; Alsoudi, 2006; Benard, 2006). Following is a review of the 
literature that has discussed education reform in the Middle East.  
Benard (2006) reports on the early voices calling for reforms in the Middle East, 
such as the famous reformists Sheikh Muhammad Abduh, Alafghani, and Tarzi, all in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. They called for a disengagement from the traditionalism 
in education that produced students who lacked critical and analytical thinking skills. 
They classified pedagogy as a normal product of the backwardness in the society itself. 
Tarzi’s writings, according to Benard (2006), critiqued the society’s lack of freedom and 
respect for women. Since then, local reformists have been critiquing the status quo and 
usually faced resistance from the public. More recently, some governments have started 
taking the initiative to establish political, educational, and economic reforms that resonate 
with the early calls for reform. These efforts must be supported, argues Benard (2006), 
instead of focusing efforts on areas that show resistance more than a “willingness to 
change” (p. 43). Robert Looney (2005) agrees with this argument and calls for the United 
States and Group eight (G-8) countries to work with local governments and local 
reformers to put the interests of those countries first so that people in the Middle East will 
be less suspicious of the intentions of the calls for reform.  
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Despite such calls for reform which have been reported for over a century, not 
many studies in the Arab World have discussed the needs for reform or the mechanisms 
to do so in detail (Ayoub, 2005). Among the voices calling for education reform in public 
schools or discussing it, argues Ayoub, only a few have offered objective analyses of the 
current conditions and suggested reasonable reforms for the future. Among these voices 
were a collection of studies published in a book by Adnan El-Amine (2005). In the 
preface to the book, El-Amine wrote that the pressures on Arab countries to reform their 
education have caused a state of tension and confusion in these countries. These pressures
have caused ongoing debates among their politicians, religious leaders, educators, and the 
public in Arab countries about the need for education reform and the agenda for 
reforming education. These debates, argue El-Amine, become rather heated and out of 
bounds, which causes objective perspectives to be absent from the scene. Fortunately, a 
few researchers who looked objectively at the issue of education reform in the Arab 
countries have not been totally absent. El-Amine argues that the book he edited contains 
examples of objective perspectives on education reform from the Middle Eastern point of 
view.  
In the first chapter of El-Amine’s book, Fatimah Sayed (2005), from Egypt, 
describes the impact of foreign aid on reforming basic education in Egypt during the 
1990s. She acknowledges the positive impact of such aid on expanding basic education, 
but warns of the negative impact of what she describes as ‘conditioned aid’ whereby the 
educational policies are directed according to the priorities of the donors. She concludes 
by recommending the full participation of the public in the Arab world in any reform 
efforts if they are to be successful. The absence of public participation, argues Sayed, 
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alienates reform efforts and turns the public against them, accusing those who try to 
promote reforms of succumbing to the Western views about life and education and 
seeking to represent these views in the curriculum. The public’s negative attitudes toward 
reform efforts lead to resistance and rejection of these efforts. Sayed argues that both 
Western countries and their enthusiastic allies in the Arab countries can easily avoid this 
resistance and rejection by listening to the local demands for reform in the frs  place.   
Education reform in some other Arab countries like Tunisia, Kuwait, Morocco, 
and Qatar was discussed in other chapters (El-Amine, 2005). While the chapters about 
Kuwait, Qatar, and Tunisia provided descriptive accounts of the reforms in these 
countries, the chapter about Morocco analyzed education reform in the country and 
attributed the success of the reform efforts to the fact that a socialist and former leftist 
opposition leader was selected to lead the government between 1998 and 2000. This 
government focused on improving access to education among the low income rural 
communities by providing food to students and focused on improving the quality of 
education by providing activities that were not typically part of the curriculum, such as 
arts, sports, and the internet. Education reform in Morocco was handled by a special 
committee that was authorized to manage reforms. Saaf (2005) said that there was 
evident resistance to the work of this reform committee from the ministry of education 
officials who felt their traditional authoritative roles were diminishing.  
The writings of Mohammed Jawad Ridha are of special interest for the purposes 
of this study (e.g. Ridha, 2005 and Ridha, 2006). Ridha ( 2005) argues that education 
reform is needed to keep students in the Arab world current about changes in the world 
and to train them to deal critically with other cultures, civilizations, and philosophies. 
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Education needs to prepare students to understand and deal with the changes in identity 
of civilizations and nations from one age to another. In order to achieve this goal, 
education must focus on training students to critically examine what they hav  been 
taking for granted, including the religious text. Ridha (2005) calls for a reform of 
religious texts and of the approaches to teaching religion. He argues that the current 
approach that prevents critical thinking and discourages creative ways of dealing with the 
texts diminishes students’ ability to use their logical thinking skills.  
Like Ridha, Bader Al-Saif (2003) presented a study criticizing the current 
religious K-12 school textbooks, especially in Saudi Arabia. Al-Saif studied Saudi 
textbooks and showed that the ideological underpinnings of the strict sect of Wahhabism 
in Saudi Arabia are being taught to children in ways that train them to “develop enmity 
and hate everything non-Muslim” (p. 17). Lessons in “the monotheism” textbook, 
Tawhid, consistently urged students not to have any form of allegiance to the non-
Muslims, not to like them, and not to imitate them. Not only do textbooks target non-
Muslims, but they also urge students not to involve themselves with any un-Wahhabi 
activities or beliefs even if they be Muslim. He concludes that a rigorous reform agenda 
is needed. Tawhid books need to be reconsidered in their entirety and only introduced to 
secondary students due to the complex nature of the theological concepts. Al-Saif further 
recommends that the authors of the religious textbooks, as well as the religious clerics 
responsible for such views, should be confronted before it is too late.  
Reactions to reform initiatives and demands 
 Western, and especially American, reform initiatives in the Middle East sprang 
from an effort to use financial incentives to improve the likelihood of democratization in 
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the region (Alsoudi, 2006).The United States, in the wake of September 11, 2001, tried to 
take strong measures against extremism in the Middle East but at the same time tried to 
work in collaboration with forces in the region to create reforms that would reduce anti-
Americanism. The latter approach has been termed “soft power” (Rugh, 2006) and has 
resulted in more aid targeting different development sectors in the region through reform 
initiatives, direct aid, training, grants, and loans.  
The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was one of the initiatives launched 
by the United States Department of State that aim at supporting democratization efforts in 
the Middle East. Under the pillar of education, MEPI aimed at improving the quality of 
education and access to it. It does so by providing grants and financial support for 
projects that achieve these goals whether to a government agency or to a 
nongovernmental organization. Since the initiative’s goals include involving people at the 
grass roots level, the initiative prefers the involvement of nongovernmental organizations 
in the democratization process (Alsoudi, 2006). This initiative and the Broader Middle 
East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative sponsored by the G-8 countries were received 
with enthusiasm by Arab leaders and officials, but with suspicion and distrust by the
public (Ottaway, 2003; Benard, 2006).  
Reactions to reform initiatives and demands in general have been mixed in the 
Middle East, and in the Arab World in particular. In his study on the impact of U.S. aid 
policy on democracy and political reforms in the Arab World, Alsoudi (2006) presented 
three perspectives on reforms representative of the Arab world. The first perspective is 
that of the Arab regimes that welcome gradual reforms in the social life of th ir people, 
but without changing power structures or impacting their regimes. The second 
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perspective is that of the Islamists who welcome quick reforms that allowfor free 
elections with the hope that they win and establish “Islamic political systems governed by 
Shari’a law, not Western-style democracies ruled by secular laws” (p. 15). The third 
perspective is the one adopted by the liberal forces and groups which welcome reforms
that create democratic institutions and allow for peaceful exchange of power. Alsoudi 
studied the Arab’s reaction to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in particular 
and found that the initiative received different reactions in different countries. On an
official level, the initiative was welcomed in Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar and 
Yemen. Other countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and United Arab Emirates have 
been less enthusiastic about it. On the public level, journalists have been reported to 
express dissension of the initiatives for various reasons. Among the reasons Alsoudi 
(2006) reported were the lack of credibility of the United States in the region due to its 
war on Iraq and support for Israel, the American support of authoritarian regimes in the 
region, the small amount of funding in the first year of the initiative compared to the
scope of desired reforms, and the fact that some “hawks in the Department of Defense … 
are skeptical about the wisdom of democratizing the Arab World” (p. 16). Alsoudi (2006) 
and Ottaway (2005) argue that this attitude within the American administration 
exacerbated the negative attitudes toward any reform initiative in the Middle East.  
Among the Arab and Middle Eastern countries, Saudi Arabia had the major blame 
for not reforming their education and received the most explicit pressures from the U.S. 
(Raphaeli, 2005). In 2005 the Saudi government responded to pressures for reform by 
holding dialogues on extremism. A five-day dialogue event focused on the need for 
reforms and concluded with recommendations encouraging political, economic, and 
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education reforms. One recommendation was that education be reformed in a way that 
“encourages a spirit of tolerance” (Raphaeli, 2005, p. 529). Addressing the pressures and 
reform initiatives and this recommendation, a group of 150 religious scholars signed a 
petition to the King asking him not to succumb to Western demands to change the 
curriculum (Modhesh, 2008). The document sent to the King of Saudi Arabia cautioned 
that the suggested reforms were dangerous to the identity of the youth in the nation a d 
could result in demoralized generations.   
Thus, three groups in the Middle East have expressed their attitudes toward 
reform initiatives publicly: 1) government officials, 2) religious leaders and scholars, and 
3) the general public through journalists. Government officials have been welcoming f 
the reform initiatives (Alsoudi, 2006; Carpenter, 2004). Scott Carpenter, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs said in remarks at the Middle Eastern Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) Summit for Peace and Prosperity that was held in
Washington, DC on October 27, 2004 that the BMENA initiative’s meetings, with the 
presence of 26 ministers from different countries, were successful. He also talked 
positively about the involvement of government officials in general. The attitudes of 
religious leaders have also been shown in the form of petitions in Saudi Arabia and 
Friday sermons and televised interviews elsewhere.  
Among the representative voices of religious leaders in the Middle East were 
Sheikh Dr. Yusuf Qaradawi and Sheikh Dr. Salaman Alawdah. Both sheikhs expressed 
concerns about the reform initiatives and demands and called for reforms that have local 
priorities in mind, not Western agendas (Qaradawi in an interview with Aljazeera, 2002). 
Qaradawi acknowledged the need for reforms, but insisted that religious scholar  should 
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lead the reforms so they can be done gradually and without harming the “fixed 
principles” of the nation. Sheikh Dr. Salaman Alawdah (2004) also expressed concerns 
about the calls and demands for education reform and stressed that any reforms need to 
be done away from the American plans and priorities. In an online article that he titled 
“the battle of education reform,” he argued that the American and Western calls to reform 
educational curriculum in Muslim countries is not a post 9/11 one, citing the example of 
the 1979 UNESCO committee “Islam and the West.” In the same article he argued that 
those demands were actually among plans that aim at undermining any possibility for 
solidarity among Muslims, which, he argues, the United States perceives as a threat to 
Israel.  
Religiosity and attitudes toward the West 
Contrary to the expectations of the impact of modernization on the world, 
religious movements have been gaining more support all over the world since the 1970s 
and 1980s (Nachtwey & Tessler, 2002). Fundamentalism has been gaining ground all 
over the world rather than losing fervor all over the world, although with special political 
implications in the Middle East due to the fundamentalists’ demand for laws that are 
based on the doctrines of Islam (referred to as Shari’a law) rather than on the needs of the 
people (Moussalli, 2008). Therefore, recent studies have focused on the role of religiosity 
in shaping the attitudes of different people towards new and current themes. While in t e 
West it has been noticed that religiosity is linked to conservative political thinking 
(Tessler, 2002), in the Middle East the picture is even more complex.  
Mark Tessler conducted several studies that involve religious orientations and 
their relationship to attitudes in the Middle East (e.g. Tessler, 2002; Tessler & Nchtwey, 
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2002; Tessler, 2003; Tessler & Robins, 2006; Tessler & Jamal, 2007). He distinguishes 
between two types of religiosity: personal religiosity-or personal piety-and political 
religiosity-or support for political Islam (Tessler, 2002). Personal religiosity refers to the 
individual’s relationship with God (Benson & Williams, 1982), which for Muslims can 
be determined by the devotion to the acts of worship, such as prayers and reading the 
Quran, and consulting with one’s faith before making important personal decisions 
(Tessler, 2002). Political religiosity, on the other hand, refers to the belief that religion 
has a social role in organizing the public’s life (Benson & Williams, 1982) and is 
embraced in the form of societal activism rather than in the form of passive rituals. In the 
case of Muslims, political religiosity refers to the tendency to believe in a stronger role 
for Islam in shaping the political attitudes of the public and in the preference of Shari’a 
laws over laws based on the interests and wishes of the people (Tessler, 2002).  
 Studies conducted by Tessler and others have shown that the relationship 
between personal religiosity and attitudes toward democracy and peaceful conflict 
resolution have been fluctuating over time. While the data from the 1980s showed 
significant associations between the two, more recent data show a lack of association 
(Tessler, 2002; Tessler, 2003). Studying the attitudes of Middle Eastern people toward
democracy, Tessler (2002) used survey research in four countries- Egypt, Algeria, 
Morocco, and Palestine (West Bank and Gaza)- and found that personal religiosity was 
not a significant predictor of positive or negative attitudes toward democracy. The same 
was true in his study on the attitudes toward conflict resolution (Tessler, 2003). He argues 
that religion is less associated with variance in political attitudes in the Muslim world 
than it is in the West. Tessler (2002) interprets the lack of significant associ tion between 
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religion and political inclinations in the Middle East as an indication that personal piety is 
higher among Middle Easterners in general and that religion has been historically 
entrenched in the politics of the region to the point that makes “religious orientations less 
useful in distinguishing among individuals with dissimilar political inclinations” (p. 17). 
The Arab Barometer 
Based on the work of Mark Tessler and modeling global democracy barometers, 
Tessler and Jamal (2006) created the Arab Barometer as a project aimed at exploring 
Arab’s attitudes toward democracy. They designed the Barometer as a public o inion 
survey in 2005 and administered it in 2006 in five Arab countries- Algeria, Morocco, 
Jordan, Palestine (West Bank & Gaza Strip), and Kuwait. The goal of the Baromete  was 
to generate scientifically reliable measures of Arab public opinion on democratic issues, 
more specifically on the attitudes toward democracy, public participation, political 
violence and terrorism, religiosity, etc (Tessler & Jamal, 2006). The Barometer consisted 
of seven sections: economic questions, political attitudes, identity and nationalism, 
politics and religion, religiosity, international affairs, and demographics 
(www.arabbarometer.org). The current study utilized the religiosity section in the Arab 
Barometer for measures of personal and political religiosity.  
The Uniqueness of Yemen 
 The Middle East is a vast region with multiple ethnicities, religious backgrounds, 
ideologies, and historical experiences (Benard, 2006; Akkari, 2004; Rugh, 2002). Yemen 
is a relatively small country in the south-western corner of the Arabian Peni sula with a 
population of 23 million people (World Factbook, 2009). Until 1990, it used to be two 
countries: South Yemen, a socialist country, and North Yemen, a republic with semi-
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democratic but largely tribal regime (Dresch, 2000). North Yemen or at least parts of it, 
century almost until the revolution in 1962, was ruled by a religious Zaydi Shiite group 
that was founded in the 9th century (Burrowes, 1995). The political regime was called the 
Imamate with the head of State as an Imam or a religious leader of the nation.  
The Imamate rule in North Yemen was marked by strict insulation from the world
and the claim of Imams to be God’s chosen leaders (Ingrams, 1964). The Zaydi Imams, in 
attempts to protect their citizens from foreign ideologies that might corrupt their religion, 
kept the country strictly secluded from the rest of the world, a fact that Ahroni (2003) 
contends had “adverse effect on [the] Yemeni[s’] … cultural and educational life” (p. 
248).  Parts of North Yemen fell to the Ottoman empire and in 1918, the Zaydi Imams 
restored power over the whole country, which is made up of two main religious sects- 
Zaydis, a form of Shiite, constituting about 45% of the population, and Shafis, 
constituting a silent majority (Burrowes, 1987).  
The Imamate rule was marked by oppression of the people, a class system that 
made the Zaydi tribes higher in social status than the peasants. Education was primitive 
and the purpose of any education was to teach people how to read the Quran. When the 
Iraqi government invited Imam Yahya to send Yemeni pupils to study in Iraq, only 
children of workmen and peasants who were not likely to have ambitions for power were 
sent. The Imam himself had to approve every student sent abroad. Unfortunately for the 
Imam, among the students he sent in 1934 was Abdullah Al-Sallal, a son of a blacksmith, 
who later became the first president after the 1962 revolution (Burrowes, 1995).  
The 1962 revolution broke out supported by the Egyptian nationalist leader 
Gamal Abdul-Nasir - known as Nasser, and the Arab Republic of Yemen was officially 
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declared in North Yemen (Ingrams, 1962; Burrowes, 1987; Dresch, 2000). The new 
republic relied mainly on Egyptian experts to run the government, establish the 
educational systems, train the army, and even defend the revolution against the return of 
Imams supported by Saudi Arabia. Formal accessible education was not established until 
the revolution in 1962, for prior to the revolution education was very limited in quality 
and access (Al-Khader, 1985). In 1967, a major war and the 70-day Siege of Sana’a 
marked the end to the conflict and the establishment of the republic as a form of 
government (Schmidt, 1968; Burrowes, 1987).  
 In South Yemen, the British control started fading and Yemeni revolutionaries 
became more empowered by the nationalist heat promoted by Abdul-Nasir in Egypt 
(Lewis, 2003). In 1963, British rule was brought to an end and British soldiers started 
leaving Aden. They completed withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and South Yemen soon 
became the first socialist state in the Arab region. After a period of turmoil and struggle 
for power, leftist leaders established the Democratic Republic of Yemen based on 
“scientific socialism” and run by officials mostly from proletarian origin (Stookey, 1982).  
 Education in South Yemen had started earlier during the British colonization era 
in the form of technical schools aimed at producing lower-level professionals and 
technicians to help with the expanding colony’s government. But besides this type of 
schools, British philanthropists had started “small schools to which Arab students were 
admitted” (Stookey, 1982, p. 43). Other than these two types of schools, Yemenis did not 
have access to British schools in South Yemen. After independence in 1967, an 
educational system was created, boarding schools were established for the Bedouins, and 
a comprehensive adult education and illiteracy campaign following a Cuban model was 
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in  full swing. The results of this focus on education was an increased education 
attainment and increased enrollment rates in South Yemen.  
 North and South Yemen were united in 1990 and the capital city of the North 
became the capital city of the unified country. However, in 1994 the leadership of the 
South retreated to Aden following a series of tensions and assassinations of Southern 
leaders. They soon declared secession. A short war took place in the summer of 1994 and 
the secessionists were defeated. Yemen became unified again, but this time by forc . 
Forceful reunification created an atmosphere of distrust between the Southerners and 
Northern authorities. Political movements with demands ranging from full rights of 
citizenship to independence from the North flourished and gained popularity in the 
Southern provinces of the unified Yemen, thus creating a zone of unrest (Hiro, 2003).  
Significance of Yemen 
 Political unrest in Yemen has also been intensified by another war in the norther  
province of Saada between the government and Shiite militia loyal to a Shiite cler c 
called Al-Hawthi. The Saada war, along with a host of other challenges including 
kidnapping of tourists, tribal violence, and “largely unpoliced countryside that alleged y 
provides a safe haven for militant groups, all combine to place Yemen near the top of the 
Failed States Index” (Corstange, 2008, p. 12-13). The security conditions in Yemen are 
not limited to the country but are of interest in the international arena. The attack on the 
United States carrier Cole in 2000 near Aden’s shore in Yemen was one of the first acts 
of terror in the region and became a propaganda tool for Al-Qaida in recruiting you
men from Yemen and Saudi Arabia (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, 2004).  
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International interest in and concern about Yemen also stems from its strategic 
location overseeing the Strait of Bab Almandab between the Red Sea and the Gulf of 
Aden, one of the busiest trade routes in the world (Cordesman, 2004). An article at the 
Guardian newspaper describes the location as important in terms of security, as well. 
Besides controlling the daily passage of 3.3 million barrels of oil through the Bab 
Almandab Straits, Yemen serves as a buffer zone between Somalia, which has been a war 
zone for over a decade, and Saudi Arabia, which has been struggling with terrorism as 
well (Hill, 2009). The importance of the location and the risk of failure of the state has 
led the Yemeni minister of planning and international cooperation, H.E. Abdulkarim Al-
Arhabi to warn the world that Yemen could become another Somalia if it is allowed t 
“slip into failure” (Hill, 2009).  
Conclusion 
 Education in third world countries has been under the influence of the West for a 
long time. Colonialism left a heritage of mistrust between the formerly colonized and 
their colonizers. At the same time, stakeholders in third world countries realize the need 
to resort to the former colonizers for contemporary educational ideas, theories, and 
practices. It is within this atmosphere of mistrust, yet technical need, that the debates 
about educational reform in the Middle East take place.  
The roots of resistance to education reform initiatives and demands can be traced 
back to the history of conflict between the colonizers and colonized. But new factors 
have emerged that also require extensive study. In the case of the Middle East, 
colonization triggered national, ethnic, and religious zeal that was used to protectthe 
identity of the colonized countries. Massialas & Jarrar (1991) argue that it w s the religio 
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us zeal that drove the North African Arab countries (referred to as Al-Maghrib Al-Araby, 
meaning the Western Arabia) to resist colonization. Religion was used to mobilize the 
public against the colonizers. Political figures, argue Massialas and Jarrar (1991), 
resorted to the religious zeal of the people to recruit more resistant forces or Mujahideen. 
It was only after the independence of these countries that political leaders decided to 
build pragmatic relationships with the former colonizers and thus, the flux of Islamization 
of politics started weakening.  
The current revival of fundamentalism and Islamization of politics have been 
atttibuted to different forces and sources, including the strength of some Muslim 
associations and organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt 
and its influx into the Middle Eastern countries (Massialas & Jarrar, 1991). Taleb (2006) 
disagrees with this view and believes that the revival was a direct result of the 
mobilization of Mujahideen against the former Soviet Union. He argues that with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of communism, the Mujahideen and the 
preachers who used to convince them and the public of the cause of fighting the ‘infidel’ 
communists became natural enemies of any foreign ideological force. They used 
suspicion of the other’s interest and intentions to recruit fighters and gain public s pport 
of the public during communism; after communism suspicion of the other remained and 
was later directed toward the West. Thus, the attitudes toward the West in general and 
toward Western initiatives in particular are arguably impacted to some degre by the 
perceived role of religion in the politics of the region. When communism was perceived 
as the enemy of Islam, religion was used to influence the public’s attitudes toward it. 
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Now the same groups of people who rejected communism are rejecting the Western 
influence on public life.  
Reforms suggested or demanded by the West have been welcomed, suspected, or 
rejected in the Middle East, depending on what group is asked. Some groups, out of fear 
of losing their interests, would oppose reforms even if they were needed in the society 
(Noland & Pack, 2007, p. 201). But other groups that are not likely to have specific 
interests in the status quo have different reasons for rejecting or accepting r forms. 
Among the reasons for rejecting reform initiatives that are heavily present in the public 
discourse in the Middle East are the following: 
• Reforms need to emerge from within not come from outside. Religious scholars 
such as Qaradawi (2002) and Alawdah (2004), as well as educators such as Al-
Farhan (2004) have stressed this theme in their public opinions about the reform 
initiatives.  
• Reforms are intended to ease normalization with Israel. This view has been 
expressed by religious scholars (e.g. Qaradawi, 2002; Alawdah, 2004), educators 
(e.g. Al-Farhan, 2004; Mansour, 2007), researchers (e.g. Alsoudi, 2006), and 
numerous journalists as reported in Alsoudi’s (2006) study and the study by 
Ottaway (2003).  
• Reforms encourage the secularization of education. Secularism in the Middle East 
is not seen as a positive force, as it is in the West. It is rather viewed with 
suspicion, mostly taken to mean ‘godlessness,’ and is perceived to bring about 
immoralities to the youth and political instability to the nations (Tamimi & 
Esposito, 2000). Religious clerics and scholars have consistently rejected reform 
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initiatives arguing that the main purpose of these initiatives is the secularization of 
education.  
Research studies exploring the views and attitudes of Yemeni and other Middle 
Eastern educators have been missing. Studies that have been conducted to solicit the 
public’s attitudes were mainly based on reviews of journalists’ writings or literature 
representing the attitudes and stances of officials on policy matters (e.g. Alsoudi’s, 2006; 
Ottaway, 2005). Other studies such as Al-Torayry’s (2004) survey that was distributed to 
the students in King Saud University in Saudi Arabia included only negative descriptive 
statements of globalization, which the students were asked to rate. No studieshave been 
conducted to solicit the views of educators or their attitudes toward Western reform
initiatives. Given the importance of the views of educators - as the most relevant 
stakeholders in education reform (Tyack & Cuban, 1995)- and the need for public 
participation (Sayed, 2005), this study acknowledges the need for involving educators 







The purpose of this study is twofold: to find out about Yemeni educators’ views 
about the need for education reform in the Middle East, and to discover their attitudes 
toward curriculum reform demands coming from Western countries. In order to achieve 
this purpose a questionnaire was constructed and administered in Yemen which solicited 
educators’ beliefs about curriculum reform and attitudes toward reform initiatives.  
Research Design 
Survey research was utilized for this exploratory, descriptive study (Rubin & 
Babbie, 2004). Frequency distributions, Chi-Square, and correlations were used to 
describe the participants’ responses to questions about the need for education reform and 
attitudes toward Western reform initiatives as well as the influence of different variables 
on these attitudes. Daniel Muijs (2004) recommends the use of such descriptive statistics 
for studies that do not seek to test hypotheses but rather explore views or attitudes of a 
group of people (p. 36). The current study falls within the category described by Muijs as 
it seeks to describe rather than make inferences and generalizations. Thus, the researcher 
used descriptive statistics to analyze the data.  
Data collection for this study used a survey questionnaire with Likert scale 
questions and open-ended questions. Likert scale questions use specific categories of 
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responses, like “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” “strongly disagree” and “are 
appropriate in the construction of either indexes or scales” (Babbie, 1995, p.184). They 
are easy to use and fill out for participants and easy to analyze for researchers. The open 
ended questions were analyzed using content analysis (Bordens & Abbott, 2005, 2008; 
Krippendorf, 2004). Content analysis is used in quantitative social science research to dd 
more in-depth data to existing measures of the topic of study. It is useful in getting the in-
depth information and then reducing it into smaller meaningful unites that can be 
analyzed quantitatively (Smith, 2000). The units of analysis can be words, phrases, 
statements, or even paragraphs. After establishing the unit of analysis, messages are 
coded numerically and numerical codes are used for analysis.  
In content analysis messages can be analyzed for manifest or latent conte. 
Manifest content refers to the occurrence of words, phrases, or expressions without much 
consideration of their context or the overall meaning, while latent content refrs to the 
overall meaning as the researcher understands it (Babbie, 1995). The researcher has “a 
choice between depth and specificity” (Babbie, p.311). Focusing on manifest content will 
increase the specificity of the analysis but with shallow results with strong reliability but 
risky validity, while focusing on latent content will give the researcher more in-depth 
knowledge but at the same time increasing the chances of involving the researcher’s 
subjectivity in the analysis, thus decreasing the reliability. Babbie argues that a skillful 
researcher either combines both contents in his/her analysis or uses content analysis s  
supplement to existing data sources. In the case of this study, the researcher used content 
analysis in addition to already existing quantitative measures. As the units of analyses 
were words and phrases, manifest content was chosen as the data source with a special
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attention paid to latent content in the form of idioms and messages included in culturally 
coded phrases or expressions. For example, a written response such as “the West are only 
interested in pushing their own agendas even if they pretend to be helping us” is 
interpreted as having suspicions about the intents of the Western initiatives, and thus is 
given a code that corresponds to the one already established for suspicion (see Appendix 
I for a sample of the coding system.)  
Instrumentation 
In order to achieve the goals of this study, a survey instrument (see Appendix B) 
was constructed to address the study’s three research questions. The survey instrument 
was a questionnaire that utilized a Likert-type scale for each question. Questions using 
Likert scale are appropriate to collect data about people’s attitudes as they give 
respondents the opportunity to express a degree of agreement ranging from stronglyagree 
to strongly disagree (Bordens & Abbott, 2005). They are also easy to answer and they 
give the researcher the opportunity to compare responses more easily (Babbie, 2004). 
Criticism to such questions includes that the responses are already framed or participants 
and so there is not sufficient room for them to express their opinions beyond what has 
been decided for them. In this study the researcher gave respondents an opportunity t go 
beyond the choices offered in each question by inviting them to add their comments as 
responses to open ended questions 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, and 3.2. Responses to the 
questions were then analyzed using content analysis.  
The questionnaire items were modeled after the Arab Barometer, a questionnaire 
that Mark Tessler and Amaney Jamal (2006) constructed to measure Arab’s attitudes 
toward democracy and the influence of different factors on their attitudes. One section of 
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the Arab Barometer was incorporated into the questionnaire used for this study, i.e. the 
section that measures religiosity. This section constituted Part III of the questionnaire 
‘religion and the society.’ Approval to use the instrument was obtained by e-mail from 
the first author, Mark Tessler, in July 2007 (see Appendix C). The second author, 
Amaney Jamal, was also contacted by e-mail and later phoned to discuss the use of som  
parts of her instrument for this study (see Appendix D). She later gave detailed feedback 
on the questionnaire used for this study and her recommendations were incorporated in 
the final draft that was distributed. The rest of the questionnaire, Part I ‘the current 
curriculum,’ II ‘attitudes toward reform initiatives,’ and IV ‘information about yourself’ 
was constructed by the researcher following the model in the Arab Barometer. The last 
three items in Part IV, however, were also adapted from Tesller & Jamal’s (2006) Arab 
Barometer because they were used to measure personal religiosity.  
To answer the first research question “What are the views of Yemeni educators on 
the current curriculum in their country?,” Part I of the survey included two sections.  The 
first section (1.1) consisted of nine statements about the current curriculum to which 
participants were asked to respond by selecting one of four responses: ‘strongly 
disagree,’ ‘disagree,’ ‘agree,’ or ‘strongly agree.’ The second section (1.2) asked a direct 
question about the need for curriculum reform and in case the respondents agreed that 
reform was needed, they had to choose from six aspects of curriculum that needed to be 
reformed. Open-ended questions, below question 1.1 and 1.2, asked for more information 
or comments.  
To answer the second question, “How do Yemeni educators view Western 
initiatives and demands that involve/encourage educational reform?” Part II of the survey 
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included two sections. The first section (2.1) asked a direct question about whether the 
participants agreed with the Western demands for education reform. It provided 
participants with a space in front of each choice where they could add more comments or 
explain why they either agreed or disagreed with the initiatives. The second section (2.2) 
included 11 statements about the perceived goals of the reform demands to which the 
participants would respond by selecting a number that corresponded to whether they 
agreed, strongly agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with each one of the perceived 
goals. An open-ended question asking for comments was also asked at the end of this 
question.  
 To answer the third question “What variables correlate with the views on the need 
for education reform and the attitudes toward reform initiatives?,” Part III and Part IV 
sought to find out about the respondents’ religiousness, views on the role of religion in 
politics, and other demographic information. Besides the religiosity questions in Part IV, 
demographic questions about each respondent’s age, gender, income, academic degree, 
etc. were asked. The researcher decided to ask about the demographics at the end of the 
survey following the dissertation committee’s recommendation and the recommendation 
of Muijs (2004, p. 50) who cautioned that questions about characteristics of the 
participants tend to make them uncomfortable and thus risk reducing the response rates.  
Pilot Study 
A pilot study in social science research helps the researcher get an estimation of 
how well the instrument will measure what it is meant to measure, whether the items are 
clear enough, and whether the length and difficulty level of the language used is 
appropriate (Baker, 1994; Black, 1999). Based on feedback from participants in the pilot 
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study, the researcher should construct the final copy of the questionnaire. Peat, Mellis, 
Williams, & Xuan (2002) recommend that a researcher ask the participants in the pilot 
study to record the time it took them to fill out the questionnaire, comment on each item 
by indicating whether or not there is any ambiguity, and respond to each item (p. 123). 
The researcher should then reword items that have been indicated as ambiguous, discard 
items that have been rejected by participants, add items that have been suggested if 
deemed reasonable, decide on whether there is a range of responses that satisfy the 
purpose of the study, and modify the whole instrument if the time taken to respond to it is 
beyond what the researcher plans. To solidify items in the questionnaire, the research r 
could also take the opinion of other experts in the field before the instrument is passed on 
to the sample for piloting (Baker, 1994). Opinions of experts will inform the researcher 
about the appropriateness of the instrument for the intended purpose, as well as the 
validity of each item.  
In this study, the pilot questionnaire was sent first to a panel of experts consisting 
of two university professors, a university lecturer, and two inspectors in Yemen, and the 
coauthor of the Arab Barometer, a professor at Princeton University in the United States. 
The members in the panel were selected because of their direct involvement in one aspect 
of the study or another. The two professors in Yemen were both teaching at colleges f 
education and had taught research courses for higher education students. One of the 
professors had taught research courses to the researcher in Yemen in 1996. The university 
lecturer had a master’s degree from the United States and had conducted research at an 
American university. He was familiar with research methods and survey questionnaires. 
The two inspectors were both from the same governorate where the actual questionnaire 
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would be distributed. They both had been supervising teachers for over 20 years and had 
been involved in research as well. All the members in Yemen were experts in education 
in the country and had some background in research methodology. The Princeton 
University professor was the co-author of the Arab Barometer, the instrument that the 
researcher modeled his questionnaire after. She was selected because of her direct 
involvement with the Barometer and her understanding of quantitative methodology.  
All the members of the panel of experts approved the instrument, and five of them 
recommended some changes. Based on their suggestions, two items were added in the 
first part of the questionnaire ‘the current curriculum in my country,’ and an introductory 
paragraph was added to Part II to clarify what one of the experts thought was ambiguity 
resulting from potential unfamiliarity with the reform initiatives in question. A 
description was added to specify what reform initiatives were referred to in that part of 
the questionnaire.  
Since the target population of the study was educators, faculty members in higher 
education institutions, school teachers, and inspectors, a homogenous sample of 21 
individuals from the Middle East involved in education was selected to participate in a 
pilot study. According to Meredith Gall, Walter Borg, and Joyce Gall (1996, p. 298) a 
sample of 20 participants from a homogenous group is sufficient to pilot a survey.  Of the
21 participants selected for the pilot study, five were contacted by e-mail bec use they 
lived in Yemen, and the rest (16) were chosen from among graduate students and 
professors from Middle Eastern countries who were teaching or studying at a Mid-
western American university at the time of the pilot study (May – June, 2008). All the 
participants in the pilot study were acquaintances of the researcher and were involved in 
 52
education or working on their degrees in fields related to education. They were all 
familiar with the educational reform initiatives and efforts and with education l research 
as well. Based on the reviewers’ comments and suggestions, questionnaire items were 
added, reworded, or modified. In total, four items were added to the questionnaire, the 
wording of five items changed, and the format of Part IV was changed to look more 
consistent with the rest of the survey.  
Participants 
The population from where the study drew its participants consisted of educators 
in Yemen who were involved in education at the grassroots level: school teachers, 
education inspectors, and higher education faculty members. Therefore, a purposive 
stratified sample was selected from each category. “Stratified sampling recognizes 
distinct subpopulations [strata] within a population” (Krippendorf, 2004, p.115).  In this 
case, the four types of educators represented the strata from which samples were drawn. 
Four assistants, who hold degrees in education, assisted in the selection of the sample and 
distribution and collection of the survey. The assistants were acquaintances with the 
researcher who were present at each research site in Yemen and all were competent 
researchers themselves. At Sana’a University, the assistant was a professo  of English 
who had conducted research with human subjects himself. The assistant at Aden 
University was a former Fulbright scholar who had conducted research during his 
master’s study in the United States. The assistant at Taiz University wa a professor of 
education. And the assistant at Taiz bureau of education was an education inspector and 
supervisor who had conducted evaluation research of teacher preparation programs f r 
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over 10 years. So, all the assistants were competent educators with research xpe ience. 
They helped select the sample and distribute and collect the questionnaires.  
The sample consisted of 500 educators as follows: 300 faculty members from the 
major three universities in Yemen, 100 school teachers from a school district in the Mid-
South, and 100 education inspectors from a Mid-Southern governorate. The reason 
faculty members were chosen is that they teach at Colleges of Education which prepare 
pre-service teachers for teaching. They are involved in the preparation of teachers in 
methodology and subject area as well.  
Procedure 
After receiving the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval to conduct the 
study (see Appendix E) in the summer of 2008, the four Yemeni assistants were 
contacted by phone and e-mail. Letters to obtain approvals to distribute the survey were 
sent through the assistants and approvals were granted from the deans of the Colleges of 
Education at three universities: Sana’a University, Aden University, and Taiz University. 
Approval was granted from the head of the department of education in the school district 
in Taiz governorate (Appendix F). The final draft of the questionnaire was then sent via 
e-mail to the four assistants along with a letter to each, a script of instructions, and an 
information sheet for each participant. The researcher had phone conversations with each 
one of the assistants to stress the importance of following the instructions and readig the 
script to each participant. These Follow-up phone calls were made during the data 
collection period (June 21 – July 11, 2008).  
The assistants then printed the surveys and the information sheets (Appendix A), 
the instructions to them with a script to read for participants (Appendix G), and the 
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invitation letters to be distributed to potential participants (Appendix H). Then, according 
to the written instructions, the assistants put the questionnaires and the information sheets 
in large brown envelopes before distributing them to participants. In the three 
universities, the surveys were distributed during the final exam period of the 2007-20 8 
academic year (June 21 -July 11, 2008). The reason for this timing was that faculty 
members are required to participate in proctoring exams and so are available to take the 
questionnaire. Besides, while proctoring they had time to respond to the survey. All the 
survey questionnaires were distributed during the same time frame. The school teachers 
and education inspectors received their surveys at an annual meeting in the Taiz 
governorate’s bureau of education. The assistant, an inspector, distributed the surveys 
randomly to 100 inspectors and 100 school teachers after two meetings, one for teachers 
and one for supervisors in June, 2008.  
Data Analysis 
Analysis of the findings of the study falls into three sections following the three 
research questions.  
1. What are the views of Yemeni educators on the current curriculum in their 
country?  
2. How do Yemeni educators view Western initiatives and demands that 
involve/encourage educational reform?  
3. What variables explain variances in the views on the need for education reform 
and the attitudes toward reform initiatives? 
 The first research question was answered by descriptive statistics and content 
analysis of participant responses to Part I of the questionnaire. Responses to items about 
 55
the current curriculum were tabulated and the percentage of people agreeing or 
disagreeing with each statement was reported. Chi-Square values were computed using 
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to find if the differences between the 
two groups were significant. Content analysis was conducted on the answers to the open-
ended question 1.2. In order to find what other views that the respondents might have 
about the curriculum.  
 The second research question was also answered using descriptive statistics and 
content analysis of question 2.1 in the questionnaire, which asked whether participants 
agreed or disagreed with the reform initiatives. Responses were counted and reported as 
percentages. Further comments were analyzed using content analysis to report the themes 
that emerged from the additional comments respondents added. Responses to items about 
the perceived goals of the reform initiatives (question 2.2) were reported in the form of 
percentages as well.  
 The third research question was split into two parts: one with views about the 
need for education reform as a dependent variable while independent variables included 
all the demographic information and the religiosity measure, and the second with 
attitudes toward reform initiatives as the dependent variable. Correlation analyses were 
conducted to test the strength of relationships between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in each part of the question (Gall, Borg, & Gall, 1996).  
 All statistical data analyses were conducted using the Statistical Pa kage for 
Social Sciences (SPSS). Answers to open-ended questions were analyzed using conte t 
analysis following Krippendorf’s  (2004) model, which includes six key processes: 
unitizing, sampling, recording/coding, reducing, inferring, and narrating (p.83). Unitizing 
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involves selecting the unit of analysis. In this case, words and phrases were determined to 
be the units of analysis. Sampling relies on selecting a sample of the text to be analyz d. 
In this study, since not all of the respondents answered the open-ended questions after 
each question in the survey, all the answers were used as the sample. The units w re then 
put into an Excel sheet where they were organized and coded in order to render them easy 
to be reduced to statistical frequencies. Occurrences of each code were tallied and a 
representation of the data was presented. Steps five and six in the content analysis model, 
i.e. inferring and narrating, were done in chapter five where contextual knowledge was 
used to interpret the findings and conclusions were made.  
Summary 
In this study, quantitative research data were collected to find out about Yemeni 
educators’ views on the current curriculum in their country and attitudes toward Western 
education reform initiatives. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the r sponses to 
the Likert scale questions. Open-ended questions were also asked in order to giv  the
participants more freedom to add comments that might not have been included in the 






FINDINGS and ANALYSIS 
 
The purpose of this study was to find out about the views of Yemeni educators on the 
need for education reform in the Middle East and their attitudes toward reform initiatives 
that come from Western countries. A survey questionnaire was designed and 
administered to three groups of educators in Yemen; university faculty members, school 
teachers, and education inspectors. Responses to the questionnaires were analyzed using 
descriptive statistics. This chapter presents a description of the participants in the study 
and the results of the statistical analyses as well as the content analysis of some open-
ended responses that address the following research questions: 
1. What are the views of Yemeni educators on the current curriculum in their 
country?  
2. How do Yemeni educators view Western initiatives and demands that 
involve/encourage educational reform?  
3. What variables correlate with the Yemeni educators’ views on the need for 
education reform and the attitudes toward reform initiatives?   
Response rate and participants’ demographics  
A total number of 500 questionnaires were distributed in five different locations  
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in Yemen, three major universities and two different meetings at the education 
department in Taiz, Yemen. With 198 returned surveys, the study has a return rate 
of 40%, which falls within the acceptable range of 20-50% according to Dillman (2007).    
Although the response rate falls within the acceptable range, it should be noted that the
researcher’s assistants faced an initial resistance to take the survey. In order for the 
researcher to overcome the initial resistance, the assistants were contacted by phone to 
ask about the types of complaints participants had. Reasons for resistance included the 
political nature of the topic, fear of the consequences of participation, and suspicion in 
the intentions of the researcher. The researcher requested that the assistants make sure 
they have told potential participants about the nature of the study and that it was for a 
doctoral student in education instead of relying on the participants to read the Information 
Sheet. These actions increased the participation rate slightly.  Following is a description 
of the demographics of participants.  
The majority of the participants in this study were in the age group of 31-40 
(59%). Table  2 shows a breakdown of participants by age group. Another relevant 
variable was the highest academic degree obtained. See Table  1 for a breakdown of 
participants by degree. Majority of the participants received their degrees from Yemen 
(70%) and only 38% had lived abroad.  Of the 187 participants who answered the 
question about gender, 85.6% were male and 14.4% were female. The majority of the 
participants were from Yemen. Only five were from other Arab countries teaching in 
Yemen. It should be noted that in Yemen the adult literacy rates, the school enrolment 
rates, and the employment rates for women are much lower than those for men (World 
Factbook, 2009).  
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Table  1 Respondents by the highest degree obtained 
Highest degree n % 
Secondary Education 3 1.6 
Diploma 26 14.0 
Bachelors 82 (35 faculty & 47 
teachers/supervisors) 
44.1 
Masters 27 14.5 
Ph.D.  48 25.8 
 
Table  2 Respondents by age 
 
 
Following are the study’s findings:  
Research Question # 1: What are the views of Yemeni educators on the current 
curriculum in their country?  
In order to answer this question, Part I of the questionnaire required participants 
to rate statements that described the content and purpose of the current curriculum. 
Statements in this question were derived from the current discourse about curriclum in 
the Middle East. Statements 1 “the current curriculum is too religious” and 2 “thecurrent 
Age group n % 
20-30 30 17.3% 
31-40 102 59% 
41-50 31 17.9% 
51-62 10 5.8% 
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curriculum is too secular” in this part of the questionnaire are contradictory and represent 
the two sides of the argument about the place of religion in education. Similarly, items 6 
“the current curriculum has elements that foster extremism” and 7 “the current 
curriculum highlights the bright sides of Islam” represent the two sides of the argument 
about whether curriculum in Middle Eastern schools fosters extremism. The rest of the 
items were intended to find out what respondents think of the need for more focus on 
democratic values, scientific knowledge, critical thinking, etc. in the curriculum. Table  3 
presents a summary of the findings from Part I of the questionnaire.  
Table  3 Participants’ responses to statements about the current curriculum 
*P<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Table  3 shows the following views: 
Religion and curriculum:  
Items  1 and 2 show that a statistically significant majority of the respondents did not 
think the curriculum was either too religious (68.3%) or too secular (89.6%). Besides, 









I believe that the current curriculum in my 
country: 
1.  Is too religious 68.3 % 31.7% 24.5*** 
2.  Is too secular 89.6% 10.4% 112.9*** 
3.  Needs reform 5.3% 94.7% 151.1*** 
4.  Is not scientific and data driven enough   21.4% 78.6% 60.2*** 
5.  Needs more democracy intake 26.8% 73.2% 39.5*** 
6.  Has elements that foster extremism 87.5% 12.5% 103.5*** 
7. Highlights the bright sides of Islam 29.3% 70.7% 31.1*** 
8. Encourages creative and free thinking 71.7% 28.3% 35.1*** 
9. Encourages rote memorization 17.6% 82.4% 79.2*** 
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item 6 shows that a significant majority did not agree that the current curriculum fostered 
extremism. Item  7 shows that a significant majority (70.7%) believe that the curriculum 
highlights the positive aspects of Islam.  
Need for reform 
Item  3 in the above table shows that a significant majority (94.7%) of the respondents 
agreed that the current curriculum needed reform. In addition to this item, question 
number 1.2 in the questionnaire was a follow-up question that asked the participants to 
identify the area of curriculum that needed reform and add any comments. Findings from 
the responses to question 1.2 showed that the priorities of reform, as identified by th 
respondents, were as detailed in the following table:  
Table  4: priorities of curriculum reform as identified by the Yemeni educators 
Total number of respondents to question 1.2 = 178  
Reform for more democracy 27.5% (n = 49) 
Reform for more scientific based knowledge 78.65% (n = 140) 
Reform to add more religion 12.36% (n = 22) 
Reform to reduce emphasis on religion 7.87% (n= 14) 
Reform to emphasize the value of tolerance 18.54% (n = 33) 
Other (creative thinking, practical skills) 7.32% (n = 13) 
 
Democracy 
Responses to item 5 in Table 3 showed that a statistically significant majority (73.2%) 
agreed with the need for more focus on democratic values in the curriculum. In the 
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second question 1.2 as well, democracy was rated second after the need for more 
scientific intake in the curriculum (see Table 4).  
Educational aspects 
 As the responses to item 8 in Table 3 show, a majority of the respondents (71.7%) did 
not agree that the current curriculum encouraged creative and free thinking. Responses to 
item 9 in Table 3 show that a majority (82.5%) thought the current curriculum 
encouraged rote memorization.  
Research Question # 2: How do Yemeni educators view Western initiatives and 
demands that involve/encourage educational reform?  
Part II of the questionnaire was designed to answer this question. It included two 
questions, the first asked a direct question about whether participants agreed with the 
Western demands to reform education in the Middle East, while the second question 
included 11 statements about the goals of the Western demands and initiatives to reform 
education in the Middle East to which participants were asked to respond by either 
agreeing or disagreeing. Following is a representation of the findings on this question: 
2.1) Attitudes toward Western reform initiatives: 
 Respondents to question 2.1 “do you agree or disagree with the demands of 
Western initiatives to reform the curriculum in Middle Eastern countries?” (n = 164) 
differed in their answers. While 46% (n = 75) said they did not agree with the demands, 
21% (n=35) said they agreed, and 33% (n=54) said they had different opinions. The 
variation among the three groups was found to be statistically significance usig a chi-
square analysis (Chi-Square = 14.65, p <.001). See Figure 1 for a graphic representation 
of this data:  
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Figure  1: Approval of the Western initiatives for education reform among Yemeni 
educators 
 
Narrative comments added as reasons for agreeing, disagreeing, or having a different 
opinion were analyzed using content analysis (Krippendorf, 2004; Bordens & Abbott, 
2008). First, a content analysis of the additional comments of the respondents who agreed 
with the initiatives was conducted. While 35 participants agreed with the initiatives, only 
28 added comments. The comments of the 28 respondents were all used as sources for the 
data units, which were determined to be phrases that explained why the respondents 
agreed with the reform initiatives. Key phrases such as “the West care only ab ut Israel,” 
or “the West are more advanced” were added into an Excel sheet and organized into 
themes, either in favor of or against. For example, a participant added a comment saying 
“no one should tell us what to do.” This was taken to mean that reforms should not be 
imposed from outside but rather should come from inside the region, which indicated a 
negative attitude. It was given a code of 1 which corresponds to the view that reforms 
should come from within. Similar statements were given similar codes. Recurrent themes 
were then tallied to get a frequency of occurrence of each theme. Percentages were 
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reported. The following table shows the themes that emerged from the content analysis of 
the comments of the first category of respondents, i.e. the respondents who agreed with 
the reform initiatives. (For a representative example of the coding process, pl a e see 
Appendix I.)  
Table 5: Additional comments by respondents who agreed with the initiatives 
Emergent Themes (n = 28) Frequency Percentage 
- Scientific and technological advancement  
- Trust in the West (Westerners know what they are 
doing 










As the table shows, the additional comments of those who agreed with the reform 
initiatives expressed less suspicion towards the initiatives and more interest in the 
educational aspects of them.  
Among the 75 participants who did not agree with the demands and initiatives (46% 
of the total respondents to question 2.1), content analysis showed the themes represented 
in Table  6. It should be noted that not all the 75 respondents added comments. The table 







Table  6: Additional comments by respondents who disagreed with the initiatives 
Emergent Themes (n = 45) Frequency Percentage 
- Suspicion about the intentions of the initiatives 32 71% 
- Not compatible with Arab/Islamic culture 18 40% 
- Reform should come from within  9 20% 
- Colonial Purposes 5 11% 
- Other (September 11 retaliation, not well studied, etc.) 2 4% 
 
Table 6 shows that from among the 75 participants (46%) who did not agree with the 
demands and initiatives, 45 added comments. The following reasons for disagreeing with 
the reform initiatives were cited:  
• Suspicion about the intentions of the reform initiatives: Out of the 75 participants 
who opposed the initiative, only 45 responded to the open-ended questions. Out of 
the 45 participants, the majority (71%) expressed their distrust in the intentions of 
the Western reform initiatives citing different reasons for their suspicion (16% 
cited the war on Iraq, 23% cited Western support for Israel, 8% cited the negative 
attitude of the West towards Muslims).  
•  Demands and initiatives were not compatible with the Arab and Muslim culture 
and civilization. The need for any educational reform initiative to be based on the 
culture of the region was mentioned by at least 40% of those who opposed the 
initiatives.  
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• Reforms were coming from outside the region. About 20% of those who opposed 
the initiatives added that the reason for their position was that they thought 
reforms need to come from inside not from outside the region.  
• Colonial purposes: At least five of the participants who opposed the initiatives 
commented that they thought the initiatives and demands had colonial purposes. 
They added that these were attempts to continue the atmosphere of colonialism 
and guardianship of the third world’s ways of thinking and child upbringing.  
•  September 11 retaliation: Two of the respondents who opposed the initiatives 
mentioned that the initiatives were only reactions to the September 11 attacks and 
so were not well studied to tackle educational problems in the Middle East.  
Of the 54 participants who said they had different opinions on the demands and 
initiatives, 48 added comments. A summary of the comments was as follows: 
Table  7: Additional comments by respondents who said they had a different opinion.  
Emergent Themes (n = 48) Frequency Percentage 
- Reform is needed but should come from within  19 40% 
- Agree with the initiatives if they respect Muslim/Arab 
culture 
24 50% 
- We can work with them on science only 8 16% 
 
Of the total respondents who chose “I have a different opinion” for question 2.1 
(n=54), 48 also added comments. Of the 48 who commented, 40% added that they 
thought there was a need for education reform in the Middle East, but they thought 
reforms should “come from within,” not from outside. About 50% added that they would 
agree with and support the initiatives if the initiatives and reform agendas comply with 
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the Muslim and Arab principles.  And about 16% commented that since the West was 
advanced in sciences, they can help Middle Eastern countries only with science.   
2.2) Perceived goals of Western demands and initiatives: 
The perceived goals of Western demands and reform initiatives are presented in 
Table  8 as percentages of participants agreeing or disagreeing with each statement. Since 
the four possible responses to each item fell in two categories, i.e. either agre  or 
disagree, they were regrouped as such in order to create a bivariate data set. Chi- quare 
values were computed to report whether the variance in the response to each item was 
statistically significant.   
Table  8: the perceived goals of Western demands and reform initiatives 
Perceived goal of the reform demands  Agree Disagree Chi-
Square 
1. Secularization of education  81.6% 18.4% 49.3*** 
2. Paving the road to normalization with Israel 81.4% 18.6% 50.95*** 
3. Improving the quality of education  53.4% 46.6% 0.69 
4. Spreading democratic values 56.0% 44.0% 2.55 
5. Eradicating the roots of terrorism 47.7% 52.3% 0.21 
6. Undermining Islamic teachings 72.2% 27.8% 34.27*** 
7. Bringing civic values to the Middle East 46.9% 53.1% 0.84 
8. Weakening extremism 54.6% 43.4% 3.61 
9. Bringing immoralities to the Muslim youth 63.1% 36.8% 12.02** 
10. Spreading a culture of tolerance  46.6% 53.3% 0.97 
11. Modernizing education to cope with development 57.0% 43.0% 3.27 
*p-value <0.05 , **p-value <0.01 , ***p-value <0.001 
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As Table 8 shows, significantly more respondents agreed with items 1, 2, 6, and 
9, which means that they thought the real goals of the Western reform initiatives nd 
demands were to make the educational system more secular (item 1), to pave the way to 
normalization with Israel (item 2), to undermine Islamic teachings (item 6), and to bring 
immoralities to Muslim youth (item 9). The participants in this survey disagreed with 
statements  3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11, which represent more positive attitudes toward the 
reform initiatives. But still more than 50% of the participants agreed with statements such 
as 5, “the goals is eradicating the roots of extremism” and 10, “spreading a culture of 
tolerance.”  
Research Question # 3: What variables correlate with the views on the need for 
education reform and the attitudes toward reform initiatives?  
In order to answer this research question, the following steps were followed. First, 
statistical descriptive indicators of the two types of religiosity - personal piety and 
support for political Islam (Tessler, 2002), were computed using participants’ responses 
to the questions in Part III of the questionnaire as well as the last three questions in Part 
IV about personal religious practices. Indicators of personal religiosity and support for 
political Islam were then correlated with the participants’ views on the need for education 
reform and perceptions of the goals of Western reform demands. Other demographic 
variables such as age, gender, highest degree obtained, and number of years the 
respondent lived abroad were also correlated with the views on the need for curriculum 
reform and the perceptions of the goals for reform initiatives. Following are the findings 
from these analyses: 
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Indicators of the types of religiosity 
Personal religiosity. Indicators of personal religiosity included reading the Quran, 
performing the daily prayers, reporting self as religious, and basing personal decisions on 
the teachings of Islam. Respondents varied on how often they read the Quran, with 59.9% 
saying they read the Quran either daily or a few times a week, and 43.3% saying they 
either sometimes or rarely read the Quran. The difference between the two groups did not 
reach statistical significance (Chi-Square = 3.59, p = 0.058). Performing the daily 
prayers, on the other hand, was reported by the majority of the respondents (87.8%), 
compared to 12% who either prayed but not regularly or did not pray at all. The 
difference between the two groups was statically different (Chi-Square = 1.07, p=.000). 
When asked whether they described themselves as religious, somewhat religious, or not 
religious, less than 5% thought they were not religious. The rest (95.8%) said they were 
either religious or somewhat religious. 
Table  9: Description of the personal religiosity indicators across the participants  
How often do you read the Quran?  
- Daily or a few times a week 




Do you pray five times a day? 
- Yes always. 





 The second indicator of personal religiosity was basing personal decisions on the 
teachings of Islam. This aspect of religiosity was analyzed using responses to question 
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3.2 in the questionnaire “when you consider what a suitable spouse is for your son, 
daughter, brother, or sister would you say that each of the following is very important, 
somewhat important, or not important?”  The following table shows how the participants 
responded to this question:  
Table 10 The importance of religion in deciding about marriage: 


















Not fasting in Ramadan 58.8% 
(n=104) 
24.3% 
 (n= 43) 
11.3% 
 (n= 20) 
5.6% 
 (n= 10) 
 
For strict Muslims decisions about personal or social life situations are based on 
the teachings of Islam. A tradition by the prophet (Peace Be upon Him) states th  if a 
man whose religious practice and moral character are acceptable approaches one for 
marriage, he should be accepted. This question shows that 82% of the participants who 
responded to this question (n = 145) said that if a person does not pray, he/she could be 
rejected if he/she proposes to marry a sibling of theirs. Fasting was similarly regarded as 
an important condition in deciding to marry someone, with 83.1% (n = 147) saying not 
fasting would constitute a real or quite an obstacle to their approval of a proposer. 
 The above tables ( 9and 10) represent the personal religiosity indicators among all 
participants. In order to compute a personal religiosity index score for each participant, 
the researcher followed the the model used by Tessler (2002) by forming an additive 
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index of personal religiosity based on the sum of scores of the four indicators:   a) reading 
the Quran, b) praying five times a day, c) reporting self as religious, and d) basing 
personal decisions on religion as follows: 
Personal religiosity measure = score on reading the Quran + score on performing the 
daily prayers + score on reporting self as religious  + score on basing personal decisions 
on religion. This score was then added as a variable for each individual participant and 
used later for further analyses. (See Appendix J for a personal religiosity index guide) 
Political Islam 
The second type of religiosity is the support for political Islam, which Tessler 
(2002) describes as the belief of individuals in active social and political role for the 
religion in organizing public’s life and running the government. The questionnaire 
included 6 Likert scale items that measured participants’ approval of political Islam. 
Responses to these statements represent how much a participant supports an active role 
for Islam in the organizing and running the politics of the country. The following table ( 
11) displays the percentages of respondents agreeing or disagreeing to each statement that 










Table  11 Responses to statements that measure support for political Islam 
Support for political Islam Percentage of respondents 
Statement Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. Men of religion should not influence how 









2. It would be better for my country if more 










3. Men of religion should have no influence over 









4. Religious practice is a private matter and 









5. The government and parliament should make 









6. The government should implement only the 









Table 11 represents how the group of respondents as a whole responded to each 
item relating to their political religiosity. To calculate a political religiosity measure for 
each individual participant, an index was created following Tessler’s (2002) model. 
Responses to the items in the table above were marked by numbers ranging from 1 
“strongly disagree” to 4 “strongly agree.” The scores for items 1, 3, 4, and 5 were 
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reversed because disagreeing with these items actually showed a stronger support for 
political Islam. Then the scores on each item were added to get a measure of each
individual’s political religiosity according to how they responded to these items (see 
Appendix K for a political religiosity index guide). Political religiosity score as well as 
personal religiosity score were added as new variables and used for further analyses.  
Correlations 
The following variables were correlated to the views on current curriculum and 
the perceived goals of reform initiatives: a) personal religiosity, b) political religiosity, c) 
age, d) gender, e) highest degree, and f) number of years lived abroad.  
Type of religiosity and the views on the need for curriculum reform: 
Table  12 correlations between types of religiosity and the views on the need for 
curriculum reform:  




1..Is too religious  -.089 -.260***  
2. Is too secular  .053 .055 
3. Needs reform  .000 -.118 
4. Is not scientific and data driven enough   .003 .001 
5. Needs more democracy intake  -.004 -.132 
6.  Has elements that foster extremism  -.113 -.358*** 
7. Highlights the bright sides of Islam .041 .158* 
8. Encourages creative and free thinking  -.011 .115 
9. Encourages rote memorization  -.025 -.089 
*significant at p<.05, **significant at p<.01, ***significant at p<.001 
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 As Table 12 above shows, personal religiosity had no significant correlation with 
any of the views on the current curriculum. Variation in personal religiosity did not 
correlate with variance in their views on curriculum. On the other hand, support for 
political Islam had three significant correlations; a negative correlation with the view that 
the curriculum was too religious, a negative correlation with the view that the curriculum 
has elements that foster extremism, and a positive correlation with the view that the 
curriculum highlights the positive sides of Islam. What these correlations mean is the 
following: personal religiosity did not matter in the views of participants on curriculum. 
While, on the other hand, whether the respondents believed in a political role for Islam or 
not was significantly associated with their views on the amount of religion in the 
curriculum and on the way the curriculum is presenting religion. Respondents with lower 
political religiosity score tended to believe that the curriculum had too much focus on 
religion and that it fostered extremism. Respondents who believed in a stronger role fo
Islam in politics tended to believe that the curriculum shows the bright sides of Islam.  
Type of religiosity and the perceived goals of reform initiatives 
Correlating the scores on the political religiosity scale with the response t  item 2.1 in 
Part II of the questionnaire shows that political religiosity correlates significantly with 
accepting reform initiatives. Item 2.1 asked whether participants agreed with the reform 
initiatives and they had three possible answers, a) I agree, b) I disagree, or c) I have a 
different opinion. Responses to this question were correlated with the types of religi sity, 
but after eliminating the third option temporarily to avoid correlating with an vague 
response. SPSS was used to select cases so only participants who answer with “I agree” 
or “I disagree” to question 2.1 are selected for the correlation analysis. After selecting the 
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cases, a bi-serial correlation with the political religiosity scale was conducted. A 
correlation coefficient of .244 (significant at p<.05) was reported. Correlations between 
political religiosity and the perceived goals of the reform initiatives wre also computed 
producing the following table.  
Table  13 Correlation between the type of religiosity and the Perceived Goals of Reform 
Initiatives 




1 Secularization of education  0.81 .062  
2 Paving the road to normalization with Israel .146 .104 
3 Improving the quality of education  -.070 -.230** 
4 Spreading democratic values -.022 -.089 
5 Eradicating the roots of terrorism -.049 -.132 
6 Undermining Islamic teachings .128 .291*** 
7 Bringing civic values to the Middle East -.100 -.161* 
8 Weakening extremism .041 -.146 
9 Bringing immoralities to the Muslim youth .157* .278*** 
10 Spreading a culture of tolerance  -.024 -.241*** 
11 Modernizing education so it copes with the current 
development 
-.101 -.196** 
*significant at p<.05, **significant at p<.01, ***significant at p<.001 
Table  13 shows that personal religiosity correlated only with one of the items 
representing the perceived goals of the reform initiatives, i.e. (item  9) “bringing 
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immoralities to the Muslim youth.” Except for this perceived goal, variance in the 
amount of personal religiosity as measured by prayers, reading the Quran, basing 
personal decisions on the principles of Islam did not result in variance in how the 
respondents perceived the goals of the initiatives. On the other hand, support for political 
Islam correlated positively with the perception that the goals of reform initiatives are to 
undermine Islamic teachings (item  6) and to bring immoralities to the Muslim youth 
(item  9). It correlated negatively with the perceptions that the goals were to improve the 
quality of education, to bring civilized values to the Middle East, to spread a culture of 
tolerance, or to modernize education (3, 7, 10, and 11). In other words, respondents who 
supported a strong role for Islam in the public life and in the government tended to 
suspect that the goals of the initiatives were to undermine Islam and demoralize Muslim 
youth. They did not think that the goals were to improve the quality of education or to 
modernize it, nor did they agree that the goals were to bring civil values or a culture of 
tolerance to the region.  
Correlations between demographic variables and the educators’ views on the current 
curriculum 
Table 14 below shows the strength and significance –if any- of association 







Table  14 Correlations between demographics and the views on the curriculum 
I believe that the current curriculum in 
my country  
Correlating Variable 




1..Is too religious  .193*** -.056 .178** .021 
2. Is too secular  -.045 -.087 -.051 .038 
3. Needs reform  .068 .022 .056 .067 
4. Is not scientific and data driven 
enough   
.100 .043 -.027 .073 
5. Needs more democracy intake  .204** -.157* .026 .050 
6.  Has elements that foster extremism  .197* -.009 .135 .044 
7. Highlights the bright sides of Islam .014 .157* .048 -.048 
8. Encourages creative and free 
thinking  
-.192* -.042 -.174* -.127 
9. Encourages rote memorization  .168* -.062 .074 .067 
*significant at p <.05, **significant at p<.01, **significant at p<.001 
 Table 14 above shows how demographic data correlated with the views on the 
current curriculum. Following is a detailed description of these correlations:  
Religion and the curriculum: Age positively correlated with the view that the curriculum 
was too religious and that it fostered extremism. Older respondents tended to believe that 
the curriculum was too religious and that it fostered extremism. Gender (male = 1, f male 
= 2) positively correlated with the view that the curriculum highlights the positive ides 
of Islam. Significantly more female respondents than male thought the curricul m 
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highlights the positive sides of Islam. Degree positively correlated with the view that the 
curriculum was too religious. The higher the degree of the respondent the more they 
tended to think there was too much emphasis on religion in the current curriculum. The 
number of years lived abroad did not have any significant correlation with any of the 
views. 
 Need for reform: None of the demographic variables correlated with any of the views on 
current curriculum. In other words, regardless of age, gender, degree, and the number of 
years lived abroad, the respondents to the study almost held the same views on the need 
for reform.  
Democracy: Item 5 in Table 14 asks about the participants’ view on the need for more 
focus on democratic values such as more participation in decision making in the 
curriculum. The two variables that had statistically significant correlations with this item 
were age and gender, with age positively correlating with the need for more democracy 
intake and gender negatively so. The older the respondent the more they thought there 
was a need for more democracy intake in the curriculum. More male respondents than 
female thought there was a need for more democracy intake.  
Educational aspects: None of the demographic variables correlated with the view that the 
curriculum was not scientific and data driven enough. Regardless of the age, gender
degree, or the number of years the respondent had lived abroad, they almost agreed on 
the view that curriculum needed more scientific and data driven content. Age and degree 
were negatively correlated to the view that the current curriculum encourages creative 
and free thinking. Older participants and participants who held higher degrees tended to 
think that the current curriculum did not encourage creative or free thinking. Age alone 
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correlated with the view that the curriculum encourages rote memorization. Older 
respondents tended to think that the curriculum encouraged memorization more than did 
younger participants.   
Correlations between demographic variables and the perceived goals of reform 
initiatives 
Demographic variables such as age, gender, highest degree, and number of years 
the participant had lived abroad were also correlated to the 11 items representing the 
perceived goals of reform initiatives. Strength and significance of correlations if any are 















Table 15 Correlation between demographic variables and the perceived goals of 
reform initiatives: 
Perceived goal of the reform demands  Correlating Variable 




1. Secularization of education  .055 -.012 .100 -.035 
2. Paving the road to normalization 
with Israel 
.017 -.044 .069 -.009 
3. Improving the quality of education  .083 .051 .054 .086 
4. Spreading democratic values -.090 .011 -.098 -.039 
5. Eradicating the roots of terrorism .006 -.066 -.060 -.106 
6. Undermining Islamic teachings -.240** .033 -.150* -.202** 
7. Bringing civic values to the Middle 
East 
.052 .108 .031 -.101 
8. Weakening extremism -.106 -.039 -.226** -.221** 
9. Bringing immoralities to the Muslim 
youth 
-.213** -.093 -.147 -.068 
10. Spreading a culture of tolerance  .022 -.051 .032 -.056 
11. Modernizing education so it copes 
with the current development 
.166* .0007 .015 -.003 
*significant at p <.05, **significant at p<.01, **significant at p<.001 
Table 15 above shows the following significant correlations: 
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Undermining Islamic teachings: age, degree and the number of years participants have 
lived abroad negatively correlated with the view that the goal of reform initiatives was to 
undermine Islamic teachings. Younger participants, participants holding lower degr es 
and those who have spent fewer years abroad or have not travelled abroad tended to agre  
that the goal of reform initiatives was to undermine the teachings of Islammore than did 
older counterparts with higher degrees and who have lived abroad.  
Weakening extremism: participants’ degree and the number of years they lived abroad 
correlated negatively with the view that the goal of the reform initiatives was to weaken 
extremism.  
Bringing immoralities to the Muslim youth: This item has been a recurrent theme in 
religious clerics’ rhetoric by which they mainly refer to the different values that allow 
drinking alcohol and having sexual relationships without marriage. Only age correlated 
with this view negatively. Younger respondents tended to agree that the goal of reform 
initiatives was to bring immoralities to the Muslim youth.  
Modernizing education: age correlated positively with the view that the goal of reform 
initiatives was to modernize education in the Middle East. Older respondents tended to 









This study examined the views of educators in Yemen on the need for educational 
reform and their attitudes toward reform initiatives coming from the West. It also looked 
at variables that influenced educators’ views and attitudes. The need for education reform 
in Middle Eastern countries has been acknowledged by educators and writers in the 
Middle East as well as in the West although with different purposes and goals. In the 
Middle East the calls for reform have been mainly to tackle development and economy 
issues, while in the West interest in education reform in the Middle East stemmed from 
security reasons. Western sponsored initiatives and demands for reform in the Middle 
East have been subject to suspicion, scrutiny, or total rejection. The current study 
examined the views of educators in Yemen on the need for education reform and their 
attitudes toward Western reform initiatives.  
The majority of respondents to the questionnaire expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the current curriculum in Yemen but did not agree with the Western demands to 
reform education. About  95% of the respondents thought the curriculum needed reform 
 but in the details of what type of reforms were needed, there were some variations. 
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Unlike Western researchers, commentators, and politicians (e.g. Ottaway, 2003; 
Friedman, 2001, 2002, 2005; Carpenter, 2005), the majority of the Yemeni educators 
surveyed in this study did not think the curriculum fostered extremism or was too 
religious. The amount of religion in the curriculum sounded just right for about 69% of 
the respondents. The majority of the respondents thought it was rather the scientific and 
academic quality of the content that needed reform.  
Yemeni educators surveyed for this study did not have the same feeling about the 
Western demands and initiatives to reform education in the Middle East. While almost
half of the respondents to the item about the Western initiatives rejected the Western 
demands (46%), less than a quarter (21%) agreed with them and a third had different 
opinions (33%). Although these numbers show a majority rejecting the Western 
initiatives to reform education, the also show that there is no complete uniformity among 
educators on either accepting or rejecting the initiatives. It all depended on what exactly 
is in those initiatives or how the educators perceived their goals. In this regard, majority 
of the respondents were suspicious of the real goals of the initiatives. Themes tat 
emerged from the literature review were all confirmed by the respondents as the 
perceived goals of Western initiatives. It is important that educators understand the real 
purpose of reform efforts, initiatives, and demands for them to truly embrace the reform
efforts.  
Conclusions 
Research Question # 1: What are the views of Yemeni educators on the current 
curriculum in their country?  
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Based on the respondents’ answers to the first part of the questionnaire (Appendix 
B) ‘the current curriculum,’ Yemeni educators perceived a need for reforming education 
but did not all agree on the types of reforms needed. The majority of the respondents 
agreed on the educational aspects of the curriculum and agreed that their curriculum was 
not adequate in this regard. For example, more than 78% thought the curriculum was not 
scientific based and lacked research based data. Regarding the mode of education, more 
than 71% thought creative thinking was not encouraged and more than 78% thought the 
current curriculum only encouraged rote memorization.  
Criticism for education in the Middle East include claims that it fosters extemism 
and that it focuses too much on religion thus creating a raft in the minds of the youth 
between Muslim and Non-Muslim world (Friedman, 2001, 2002, 2005; Rabasa, 2004, 
Looney, 2005 ). The majority of the respondents to the questionnaire did not agree with 
these claims. To the contrary, they thought the curriculum highlighted the bright and 
positive aspects of Islam. Unlike the criticisms directed to education and the curriculum 
in the Middle East by individual scholars and politicians, the official reform initiatives, 
such as MEPI and the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative (BMENA) do not 
explicitly mention religion or extremism. However, they mention democracy and the 
need for education in the Middle East to increase the democracy intake in the curriculum. 
They also encourage creative and free thinking and the scientific and data riven content. 
These three areas were highly agreed on by respondents to the questionnaire.  
Research Question # 2: How do Yemeni educators view Western initiatives and demands 
that involve/encourage educational reform?  
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Responses to Part II of the questionnaire showed that educators in Yemen were 
not all supportive of the Western initiatives and demands to reform education in the 
Middle East. Although the majority of the respondents agreed that there was a need for 
education reform, only 21% (n = 35) supported the Western initiatives that included 
education reform, such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). On the other 
hand, 46% (n = 75) of the respondents expressed their disapproval of the reform 
initiatives and 33% (n=54) were neither with nor against the reform initiatives.  
Although only 21% supported the initiatives, this number is quite positive given 
all the suspicion and unwelcoming attitudes in the Middle East toward Western agendas. 
The majority of those who supported the initiatives wrote that their reasons for 
supporting such initiatives were that education needed to be reformed, that education 
needed more scientific and advanced content, and that the West were more advanced and 
had only good experiences to share with the rest of the world. Discontent with the 
political regimes’ control of education was also one of the motives for supporting 
Western initiatives although only a small minority of respondents mentioned it. The 
researcher concluded that even though only 21% supported the initiatives, this number 
shows flexibility among some educators to work with Western partners toward reforming 
education in light of the local needs.  
The comments added by the group who answered this question with “I have a 
different opinion” (n = 48 since not all of them commented) add more depth to the 
understanding of educators’ attitudes toward reform initiatives. The majority of the 
responses in this group expressed interest in what the Western initiatives can offer for 
education in the Middle East even with the concern that these initiatives might as well 
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have different agendas. Respondents in this group acknowledged the need to reform 
education and the potential these initiatives have for reforming education. The researcher 
concluded that if this group is assured of the professional and practical intentions of the 
initiatives, they could become a driving force for reform since they constitute the 
influential majority. If this group of educators is convinced that the reform initiat ves and 
reform efforts are not going to negatively impact their culture, religion, and political 
causes, they will be more likely to join the efforts. And if this group of skeptical 
supporters of reform joins the reformists, the majority of educators will be on the side of 
reform initiatives, granting them success and public support. Without public support 
(Sayed, 2005; Woempner, 2008) and the support of educators in particular (Tyack & 
Cuban, 1995), reform initiatives will not succeed.  
The politics of globalization and the rhetoric of postcolonialism were almost 
absent from the comments of those who supported Western initiatives. The only mention 
of the different cultures and politics was from the few who said that they agreed with the 
reform initiatives because they encouraged more freedom, cultural contacts ad tolerance 
of others. This indicates that those who supported the reform initiatives were eithe 
supportive of cultural contacts with the West in general, or were more interested in 
educational matters than politics.  
The group that opposed Western reform initiatives (46% of the respondents) 
mainly disagreed with the perceived intentions of the initiatives, not with the need for 
reform. The air of suspicion of the former colonizer persisted here and those who rejected 
the initiatives added comments that described their rejection of foreign interference in 
local affairs. Comments like “change can only come from inside” and “the West is only 
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pushing their own agendas” show a lack of trust in the intentions of the reform efforts or 
the credibility of the Western partners in reform.  
It is worth mentioning here that the high percentage of educators agreeing on the 
need for education reform, as reported from the responses to Part I of the questionnaire, 
did not guarantee acceptance of the reform initiatives. The fact that educators 
acknowledge the need for reform does not mean they will be ready to accept initiatives 
coming from the West. This finding is in agreement with the literature on education 
reform in the postcolonial era (e.g. Kamat, 2004; Dale, 1999; Tikly, 2001), where the 
formerly colonized people usually reject or at least suspect any initiative by the former 
colonizers. In the case of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Broader 
Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative, the most prominent proponent of 
reforms is the United States of America, which has not been an actual colonizer in the 
region. However, the perceptions of educators are still framed within the colonizer-
colonized relationship. In fact, even in the studies and papers presented by some Arab 
authors and researchers on the issue of reform initiatives, reference to the United States is 
usually made in conjunction with “the colonial powers” (e.g. Al-Torayry, 2004; Ammar, 
2004; Mansour, 2007). Mostafa Mansour (2007) particularly referred to MEPI as a tool 
that is being used to distort the Muslim character and “raise a generation that is stripped 
of any national or moral identity” (p. 606). Quoting heavily from a book by Professor 
Hamed Ammar, an Egyptian educator well-known in the Arab world, Mansour  describes 
MEPI as an imperialist tool that seeks to destroy the Arab youth. He calls for defying the 
reform initiatives by initiating reforms with national agendas to confront any attempts to 
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force any ideals that do not comply with the historical and cultural backgrounds f the 
Arab societies.  
Given all the suspicion and resistance among educators and authors alike, the 
responses to question 2.2. in Part II of the questionnaire were not unexpected. The goals 
of the reform initiatives were perceived more as political and having hidden agendas than 
as simply launching reforms for the improvement of education. Among the 11 perceived 
goals in the questionnaire, the two goals that received the highest agreement rates were: 
“[the goal of these reform initiatives is:] secularization of education” and “paving the 
road to normalize with Israel,” with over 81% of the respondents agreeing with each 
statement. Ammar (2004) argues that reducing the amount of religion in the lives of Arab 
youth is one of the consequences of September 11. Other consequences include serving 
the interests of Israel through pushing Arab countries to normalize with Israel (M nsour, 
2007, p. 610). It is of special interest here, however, to note that only 18% disagree with 
the two statements as the actual goals of reform initiatives. This means that among the 
21% (n = 35) who said they agreed with the reform initiatives in question  2.1, some 
expressed their approval of Western initiatives even though they thought the actual goals 
were to secularize education and to normalize with Israel. The researcher concluded that 
despite the suspicion of the intentions of the reformists and the reform initiatives, some 
Yemeni educators are ready to embrace reform initiatives even when they are in 




Research Question # 3: What variables correlate with the views on the need for 
education reform and the attitudes toward reform initiatives?  
 Responses to Parts III and IV of the questionnaire provided the answers to this 
research question. Measures of the two religiosity orientations were computed using the 
responses to question 3.1 and 3.2 from Part III, and responses to the last three items in 
Part IV.  Demographic questions in Part IV provided the demographic informati n that 
was used for the correlations. Correlation between the demographic variables and 
religiosity orientations on one side and the views on current curriculum and the attitudes 
toward reform initiatives on the other side provided a description of the qualities of likely 
partners in the reform efforts, as well as an understanding of some of the variables across 
which educators in the Middle East differ in their views to Western initiatives and 
demands. Such an understanding could be useful when deciding about public policies 
relevant to education reform or initiatives patronized by global partners in development 
or democratic reform to better address the concerns of likely rejecters.  
Religiosity  
 Religiosity was measured using two different scales, one for personal religiosity 
and one for political religiosity. Like Tessler’s studies (2002) and Tessler & Jamal(2006), 
this study found that religious orientations correlated differently with attitudes toward 
Western initiatives. While personal religiosity did not have significant correlations with 
the views on the current curriculum or the attitudes toward Western reform initiatives, 
support for political Islam did. Praying, reading the Quran, and basing personal decisions 
on religion were not important predictors of the views on the curriculum or attitudes 
toward reform initiatives. On the other hand, respondents who had different scores on the 
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political religiosity measure were found to have different opinions regarding the current 
curriculum and the reform initiatives.  
Personal religiosity and the current curriculum 
 The assumptions in many American writings on issues in the Middle East suggest 
that religion is part of the problem in the region, and that the tendency to make religion 
the center of people’s lives creates an atmosphere of orthodoxy where new ideas an  
tendencies are rejected (Friedman, 2005). This assumption, however, is not supported by 
this study’s findings that show an increase in personal religiosity not correlating with an 
increase in suspicion of the Western initiatives or with rejection of them. From the 
correlation between personal piety index and the responses to the items in Part I about the 
current curriculum, it is clear that praying five times a day, reading the Quran, and basing 
decisions on the teachings of Islam did not necessarily associate with a rejection of 
democracy in the curriculum. At the same time, personal religiosity was not ass ciated 
with any other responses in the same part of the questionnaire, which means that 
variation in personal religiosity did not necessarily mean variation in one’s view  on the 
current curriculum. While this could be taken to mean that views on the current 
curriculum are almost similar among people with different degrees of religious 
commitment, it could also be interpreted in light of what Tessler (2002) describes as a 
higher level of personal religiosity in the Arab region in general, thus making religiosity 
orientation an unlikely predictor of variation in political views.  
Personal religiosity and the attitudes toward reform initiatives 
Literature on the attitudes toward reform initiatives shows a consistent message 
among Muslim religious scholars and leaders arguing that the real goal of Western 
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initiatives to reform education is the secularization of education (e.g. Qaradhawy, 2002; 
Alawdah, 2004). The findings in this study show that educators were not any different 
from the religious scholars in this attitude, regardless of how much they are committed to 
religious practice. Correlation analysis showed no significant correlation between 
personal piety and the views that the goal of these initiatives was to secularize education. 
When we consider this finding along with the large percentage of educators (81%) 
agreeing that the goal was to secularize education, it becomes clear that regardless of the 
personal religiosity measure of respondents, they almost all thought the purpose was 
secularization of education. Whether or not respondents were supportive of secularization 
of education was not clear from the response to this item.  
To gain insights about the respondents’ views on the secularization of education 
the researcher looked at their responses to the open-ended question 1.2 in Part I that 
asked them to identify the area of education needing reform. Out of the 178 who added 
comments on the need for reform in education, only 13 said that the curriculum needed 
less religion. Also a correlation between responses to item 2.1 (“do you agree with the 
reform initiatives?”) and the response to the item in 2.2 (“the goal is secularization of 
education”) showed a significant value (.444, p<.001), suggesting that those who rejected 
the initiatives tended to believe that the goals of Western initiatives were to secularize 
education more than did participants who agreed with the initiatives. It is clear that the 
educators who opposed the initiatives were more likely to think their goals were to 
secularize education. But not all of those who thought the goal was secularization of 
education were opposed to the initiatives. This shows that some educators - though not 
statistically significant number - were actually in favor of a secular education.  
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Political religiosity 
 Support for a political role for Islam was found to be significant in the sample of 
this study. Variance in political religiosity was also found to be significat. Age, 
academic degree, and the number of years the participant has lived abroad were 
negatively correlated with support for political Islam. The older the respondents, the less 
they supported political Islam and believed in a separation between Islam and politics. 
The same is true about the highest academic degree obtained. Respondents with higher 
degrees tended to believe in a separation between Islam and politics. Respondents who 
lived abroad for a long time also tended to believe in a less political role for Islam. These 
findings draw a portrait of those who support political Islam as younger people who have 
not lived abroad and who are less educated, a profile that matches with the description of 
school teachers rather than professors. Most of the university professors must have lived 
abroad, since the Yemeni universities have just recently started granting higher de r es.  
Political religiosity and views on the current curriculum 
 Unlike personal religiosity, variance in political religiosity was asociated with 
variance in the views on curriculum in terms of its religious content. Political religiosity 
was negatively associated with the view that the curriculum was too religious (-.260**, 
p<.001) and that it fostered extremism (-.358**, p<.001). Educators who thought religion 
should be separated from politics were more likely to think the curriculum needed reform
because of its heavy emphasis on religion, and vice versa. This group of educators was 
also more likely to think that the curriculum fostered extremism.  It is important to 
remember here that age and academic degree correlated negatively wi h political 
religiosity, which means that the older and more educated educators tended to believe 
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that curriculum needed reform in order to decrease the religious content and to make it 
less likely to foster extremism. Educators with higher political religiosity scores tended to 
believe that the current curriculum highlights the positive side of Islam more than 
educators with lower political religiosity scores.  
Political religiosity and the attitudes toward reform initiatives 
 Again, educators were divided by their views on the political role of Islam, and 
this division was associated with variance in their perceptions of the goals of the Western 
reform initiatives. Political religiosity was significantly associated with negative 
perceptions about the goals of the reform initiatives in terms of the educational value they 
intend to bring. Educators with lower scores on the political religiosity index were mo e 
likely than their colleagues with higher political religiosity scores to believe that the goals 
of the reform initiatives were to improve the quality of education and to modernize 
education. They were also more likely to think that the goal was to encourage the value 
of tolerance and to bring civilized values to the Middle East. On the other hand, educators 
with higher scores on the political religiosity scale tended to believe that the goals were 
to undermine Islamic teachings and bring immorality to the Muslim youth. One of th
participants added in the comment section that “they hate us because of our values.” 
Demographics  
Findings of the study showed a significant association between age and political 
religiosity and between age and the views on the current curriculum and the perceived 
goals of reform initiatives. Educators with a higher political religiosity cores tended to 
be older, with higher degrees, and having lived abroad more than those with lower scores 
on political religiosity. This finding is important in two ways. First, it shows that 
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education and contact with others are reflected in less fundamentalism in the beliefs 
about the role of religion in politics. But the other important part of this finding is that the 
younger educators, who constitute the future of education in Yemen, are in favor of a 
stronger role for religion in politics. This would not be a problem, except that political 
religiosity is also associated with negative attitudes toward reform initiat ves and with 
support for aspects that have been demonstrated to need reform in the current educational 
system. Therefore, it is important to address the concerns of young teachers when 
initiating any reform efforts.  
Demographics and the views on the current curriculum  
Age was associated with critical views on the current curriculum. The older the 
participants were, the more likely they were to be critical of the content of the 
curriculum, believing that it was too religious (r=.193, p<.05) and included elements that 
fostered extremism (r = .197, p<.05). Age also correlated positively with the view that the 
curriculum did not have sufficient focus on democratic values and that the curriculum 
encouraged learning through rote memorization. Older participants were more likely to 
show concern for the lack of democratic intake and to think the curriculum encouraged 
rote memorization rather than free and critical thinking. One might assume that since the 
two variables of age and degree were highly inter-correlated (r=.0527, p<.001), the same 
correlations would be observed between ‘degree’ and the views on curriculum and that 
these correlations would be inflated as a result of the multicollinearity (Washington, 
Karlaftis, & Mannering, 2003). However, since inferential statistics were not used, the 
effect of this multicollinearity will not skew the findings of the study, especially given 
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that the correlations with other factors are not always the same among the two 
intercorrelated variables of ‘age’ and ‘academic degree.’   
Like ‘age,’ ‘degree’ was positively correlated with the view that the curri ulum 
was too religious, and negatively with the view that the curriculum encouraged free and 
creative thinking. But it did not correlate with the other views on curriculum, which 
means that regardless of the academic degree held by the participants, they ended to hold 
almost the same views on curriculum. The only differences were that educators with 
higher degrees tended to be critical of the emphasis of education on religion and its l ck
of encouragement for creative and free thinking. Surprisingly, except for the view that the 
curriculum was too religious, the number of years participants have lived abroad was not 
associated with other views on the current curriculum.  
Demographics and the perceived goals of the reform initiatives 
 Findings from the correlations between the demographic variables and the 
perceived goals of the reform initiatives show that educators who were older, held higher 
degrees, and had lived abroad for longer periods of time were less suspicious of the 
intentions of the reform initiatives. Suspicions that the real goals of the Western reform 
initiatives are to undermine Islamic teachings or to bring immoralities to the Muslim 
youth were not supported by the older participants, compared to younger ones who 
tended to agree. Age also positively correlated with the view that the goal of the 
initiatives was to modernize education in the Middle East. This shows that the younger 
participants had less trust in the initiatives than older ones.  
 The other demographic information - the highest academic degree and the number
of years lived abroad - correlated negatively with the view that the real purposes of the 
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reform initiatives were to undermine Islam or to weaken extremism. Educators with 
higher education attainment tended to reject the suspicion that the initiatives t rg ted 
Islamic values, as is usually claimed by Middle Easterners. Given the strong inter-
correlation between the variable of number of years lived abroad and the variable of 
academic degree (r=.730, p<.001), looking at how the other variable correlates with the 
perceived goals should not reveal significant values. The reason for this high 
intercorrelation is probably because higher education studies are new to Yemeni 
universities and the only way that was previously available for people to get a higher 
education was to travel abroad. It was not until the late 1990s that some universities in 
Yemen started offering higher education studies in a few humanistic specializations.  
Summary and Implications 
When education reform is considered, it is very important to include the public 
voice as much as possible (Cuban, 1995; Sayed, 2005; Ottaway, 2003; Alsoudi, 2006; 
Benard, 2006). Educators’ voices, in particular, are critical since they are the ones who 
will be involved with the any reformed policies or priorities. It is true thatin the Middle 
East, teachers do not have a say in educational policy-making or in the way education is 
planned, the curriculum is organized, or the priorities for teaching and learning are made. 
But resistance among teachers and educators to any policies or ideas will cripple any 
policy or reform efforts. It is thus important to understand the sources of resistance and 
suspicion and address them when deciding about reforms. It is also important to know 
who the likely partners in reforms are so that time and efforts are not wasted trying to 
“flog a dead horse” (Benard, p. 43).  
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Three important findings in this study can be very helpful to policy makers and 
reform patrons. The first is the overarching belief in the need for education reform to 
improve the quality of education, to allow for more democracy intake in the curriculum, 
and to promote tolerance of others. These beliefs show a potential for having local 
reformists who lead reform initiatives. This hopeful belief is, however, faced with the 
second important finding, which is the high level of suspicion among educators toward 
Western reform partners and the lack of credibility the West has accumulated in the 
region. Although the lack of credibility has been a recurrent theme in the relationship 
between “the West and the Rest” of the world, especially framed in a context of he 
relationship between former colonizers and formerly colonized (Rizvi, 2004), this lack of 
credibility and high sense of suspicion in the Middle East is stronger due to different 
historical events and political conflicts. It is important to understand the source of these 
attitudes to be able to address them.  
Lack of credibility of the West has been reinforced and emphasized more by the 
feelings that the West had certain cultural and political causes it is interested in advancing 
regardless of the needs of the Middle East region. In terms of politics, the major obstacle 
to building credibility has been the Western pro-Israeli stance on the conflict between the 
Arabs and Israel. Arabs’ reaction to such a stance has been an intensified suspcion of the 
intent of any Western initiative (Ottaway, 2003; Alsoudi, 2006). The war in Iraq has been 
another reason for the increased lack of credibility, as cited by many participan s in the 
study. The type of religious rhetoric adopted by influential religious leaders and 
preachers has also been fueling these suspicions. Religious leaders and preachers have 
been cautioning the public against any foreign interference with the culture or th  
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education of the youth. The term “cultural invasion” spread widely in the 1970s and 
1980s as religious leaders were fortifying the public against communism. Dr. Abdulaziz 
Altwaijri (1998), the director general of the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (ISESCO), described the newly coined term “cultural invasion” as a result 
of “overstated warnings and dangers” (p.33).  
The third important finding in this study is the portrait of the likely rejecters and 
the likely partners of reform initiatives. Unfortunately, the rejecters of eform are the 
majority in the region and unfortunately, too, they are the younger cohort, which means 
that the future could be more challenging. Younger educators were also more likely to 
believe in a stronger role for Islam in running the governments, which shows tat 
fundamentalism is indeed in the rise in the Middle East. This finding is not in 
contradiction with the trend in the whole world, however, as it is argued that 
fundamentalism is gaining ground and is replacing the cold-war political and ideological 
bases for conflict (Lawrence, 1989; Ruthven, 2004).  
Reformists in the region have to work with the younger educators who have lower 
academic degrees toward joining efforts with international partners to impr ve the quality 
of education in the region. International agencies and Western entities interested in or 
concerned about education reform in the Middle East have to work with already willing 
partners. According to this study, older educators with higher degrees and ones who have 
lived abroad for substantial periods of time are the more likely willing partners. The 
researcher doesn’t recommend ignoring the likely rejecters of reform initiatives, but 
rather working towards winning their support especially given their understanding of the 
need for reform.  
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One of the concerns raised in this study, besides the trend among the younger 
respondents to support political Islam and to reject reform initiatives, is the discr pancy 
between Yemeni educators’ understanding of the need for reform and their attitude 
toward reform initiatives. One would assume that when initiatives aiming at “fixing what 
is wrong with education,” as the director of the RAND initiative for Middle Eastern 
youth (Benard, 2006), argues would gain the support of those who are not satisfied with 
their educational systems in the region. This study shows that this is not the case. This 
indifference to Western initiatives can be understood in the light of the history of tensions 
in the region, the legacy of colonization, and the post-9/11 atmosphere of mutual distrust. 
If in India the reaction to globalization has been a revival of Hindu fundamentalism 
(Kamat, 2004), in the Middle East there is a tendency among the youth and even among 
cohorts that are not necessarily religious to oppose the West. Personal piety is
widespread, but regardless of the amount of personal religiosity, there is a tendency 
among the youth to reject Western initiatives.  
From his own experience in the United States and from watching televised 
debates and reading editorials, the researcher is clear that Americans are puzzled by the 
resistance to reform initiatives or proposed regime changes even though the people of the 
Middle East complain of their conditions and cry for change. What needs to be 
understood here is that dissatisfaction with local conditions does not mean that the locals 
are going to welcome outside influence. In fact, some people in the Muslim Middle East 
tend to believe that tyranny might be acceptable when their nation is faced with external 
dangers (Tessler & Jamal, 2006; Al-Wazir, nd.) The Yemeni historian, thinker and editor,
Zaid Al-Wazir, wrote that historically some Muslim Arab figures were ty ants, but their 
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warfare against invaders made the masses forgive them their tyranny and embrace them 
as national and religious heroes. For example, Al-Wazir cited Saladin, an army 
commander who defeated the Crusaders to defend the Muslim land, and Saifuddin Qutuz 
who defeated the Tatars. These two figures have been celebrated by Muslim nations un l 
today even though, according to Al-Wazir, they were not necessarily fair to their wn 
people. This shows that when the public senses a danger to the identity of the nation (Al-
Farhan, 2004), they are more likely to put up with local imperfections than they are to 
accept what they perceive as an external threat. In the case of this study, respondents who 
believed that there was a hidden agenda behind Western demands for curriculum reform 
and those who believed the real purpose of these demands was to benefit Israel, were 
more likely to reject the reform demands even though a majority of them have agre d that 
education in the Middle East needs reform. It is the rivalry and perceived threat that 
makes accepting a local imperfection a better option than accepting the threat.  
Another potential interpretation can be found in the cultural differences in context 
requirements (Hall, 1989; Hecht, Anderson, & Ribeau, 1989). Hecht et al.(1989) explain 
that cultures are different in the way they rely on communication processes. Some 
cultures rely on high context communication, which means that messages need to be 
understood not in and by their mere content, but by the context surrounding them and the 
relationship between the receiver and the deliverer of the message. Other cultures rely 
more on the mere content of the message for communication. The latter are called low 
context cultures. High context cultures tend to trust more the ‘in-groups’ and infer 
meanings from the culture rather than the message, while low context cultures tend to 
focus on the message itself and treat in-groups and out-groups similarly. It is argued that 
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the cultures in Western Europe and the United States are low context, while Eastern and 
Latin American cultures are high context. In this sense it can be argued that people in the 
Middle East are suspicious of the intent of the out-group reform initiatives even though 
the content of the message of reform is similar to the one they believe in. This cultural 
difference can also explain the resistance to participate in the survey (Johnson, O’Rourke, 
Burris & Owens, 2002), as the participants tend to read in the questions more than is 
written and suspect the intentions of the researcher.  
In conclusion, it is important for policy makers and international reform initiative 
patrons to understand the sources of resistance in the Middle East so they can better 
address them and maximize the use of resources. It is highly advisable that reform efforts 
involve local partners and try to start with the local reformists’ agendas rather than bring 
new agendas and plans to the region. It is also advisable to be aware of the political
sensitivities in the region and to make sure they are being respected. For the West in 
general and the United States in particular, the relentless pro-Israeli support remains a 
hurdle in building credibility in the Middle East. Striking a more balanced foreign policy 
in the Middle East, especially in regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict, would create a better 
environment for mutual respect and partnership. Without that, the journey for winning 
hearts is not going to be easy.  
Discussion 
This study has been the first, to the best of my knowledge, to explore the beliefs 
and views of educators in any Middle Eastern country about the need for reform and the 
Western reform initiatives. The study crossed the boundaries of what could be done in the 
Middle East in terms of research, as it asked questions about religion, religion in the 
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curriculum, and included items about Israel and thus was faced with resistance from the 
very beginning. However, three respondents (all with Ph.D. degrees) wrote thank you 
notes at the end of the questionnaire, one of them reading “thank you for these brave and 
very appropriate questions.” But these “brave and appropriate questions” made it very 
difficult to get approvals to conduct the survey and the researcher had to make follow ups 
and ask friends for help. Given the sensitivity of the topic and the type of questions 
asked, some respondents expressed concerns that the findings of the study would “benefit 
the Zionists and imperialists,” as one of the respondents commented in bold red. Some 
expressed concerns that the actual purpose of the study was not academic, but rather 
gathering information for intelligence agencies (the researcher was told this by phone and 
is not sure if it was a serious comment).  
As with any other research, there are limitations that need to be taken into 
consideration when reading the findings. The first limitation for this study was the non-
probability sample. Rather than a probable sample that would give everyone in the 
Yemeni society an equal opportunity to be in the sample, this study was limited to a 
stratified purposive sample of three types of educators. However, the large sampl  ize 
(500 with 198 returned questionnaires) and the fact that the sample represents a 
homogenous group of a highly relevant population to the research questions ameliorate 
this limitation. Educators were chosen because of their role in interacting wi h any reform 
initiative and for their first hand experience with the curriculum.  
As an exploratory descriptive study, the goal was not to generalize on the basis of 
the findings of this study, but to be able to describe the views and attitudes of the sampl  
studied in relation to demographic and religiosity factors. Therefore, only descriptive 
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statistics were used to describe but not infer from the sample to the population. However, 
given the large sample it is fair to assume that the descriptive statistics in his study 
provide a portrait of the population of educators in Yemen. The relatively low response 
rate (40%) could have been improved had the researcher been available in the research 
sites to make direct follow ups with the participants and to answer their questions. But the 
researcher’s conclusions are based on the well established tradition in survey research 
that this percentage is within the acceptable range (Dillman, 2007; de Leeuw, & de Heer, 
2002).  
Although the survey return rate was within the acceptable range, a higher rate 
could have been possible had the researcher had direct access to the participants. But 
since the contact between the researcher, who lived in the United States, and the 
participants in Yemen was facilitated by assistants in Yemen, this contact was not 
established and hence there was no direct follow-up with the participants. The assistant  
in Yemen reported that in a few cases the participants asked some questions about items 
in the questionnaire to which the assistants did not have answers, such as the question “if 
lottery was available in your country, would you participate?” After receiving an e-mail 
from one of the assistants about this item, the researcher e-mailed and phoned the other 
assistants to tell them how to clarify this question if asked. This was done to guarantee 
that all participants received the same information.  
Recommendations for Further Studies 
 The original plan for this study was to conduct it in five representative countries 
in the Middle East, but due to the limitations of time and resources as well as the nature 
of the questions and lack of direct access to participants, it was then limited to Yemen. 
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Further studies can replicate this study in other countries, even with changes in th  design 
or survey questions. Possible changes that would enhance the findings of possible replica 
studies include adding a qualitative component where a sample of participants is 
interviewed for more in-depth insights. Another possible change is using online surveys 
instead of pencil and paper. Online surveys will be easier to distribute in different 
countries. The reason this study did not use online survey was that in Yemen the majority 
of the schools and university professors do not have computers or access to the internet. 
Finally, since this study has identified significant factors that are associated with 
important views on education and attitudes toward reform initiatives, and utilized 
descriptive statistics, further studies could use inferential statistics to be able to better 
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THE SURVEY INSTRUMETN 





































Survey of educators’ attitudes toward curriculum reform in the Middle East 
Part 1: The current situation of curriculum:  
1.1) Please read the statement then circle the number that corresponds to your 
opinion about it.  
 
Please comments about the current curriculum in your country:  
............................................................................................................................................  
............................................................................................................................................  
1-2. In your opinion, does the current curriculum need reform? 
a) Yes, it needs reform (please select one of the reasons below or add yours) 
i. To become more scientific 
ii.  To emphasize democratic values 
iii.  To become more religious 
iv. To reduce emphasis on religion 
v. To pay more attention to the value of tolerance 
vi. For other purposes  (please mention them): 
…………………………………… 












I believe that the current curriculum in my country: Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1.  Is too religious 1 2 3 4 
2.  Is too secular 1 2 3 4 
3.  Needs reform 1 2 3 4 
4.  Is not scientific and data driven enough   1 2 3 4 
5.  Needs more democracy intake 1 2 3 4 
6.  Has elements that foster extremism 1 2 3 4 
7. Highlights the bright sides of Islam 1 2 3 4 
8. Encourages creative and free thinking 1 2 3 4 
9. Encourages rote memorization 1 2 3 4 
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Part 2: Western demands for curriculum reform in the Middle East:  
2-1. In Western initiatives such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) 
and the Greater Middle East, education was brought up as one of the major a eas 
needing reform. The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) includes a section 
about the need to reform education in the Middle East. The education ‘pillar’ in the 
initiative emphasizes the need for increasing access to and the quality of education. 
Reactions to the initiative have varied. This item in the survey asks for your opinion 
about the educational parts of this initiative and others.  
 Do you agree or disagree with the demands of Western initiatives to reform the 
curriculum in Middle Eastern countries? Please add your comments to your choice. 
a) I agree for the following reasons: 
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
b) I don’t agree for the following reasons: 
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
c) I have a different opinion: 
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
2-2) Please circle the number that best represents your opinion on the purpose of 
curriculum reform demands: 
I think the goal of curriculum reform 
demands is:  
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1.  Secularization of education 1 2 3 4 
2. Normalizing with Israel 1 2 3 4 
3.  More scientific and data driven 
curriculum 
1 2 3 4 
4.  Spreading democratic values 1 2 3 4 
5.  Eradicating roots of terrorism 1 2 3 4 
6.  Undermining Islamic teachings 1 2 3 4 
7.  Bringing civilized values to the 
Middle East 
1 2 3 4 
8.  Reducing extremism 1 2 3 4 
9.  To bring immoralities to the Muslim 
youth 
1 2 3 4 
10.  To foster tolerance  1 2 3 4 








Part 3: Religion and the Society 
3-1 Statement  Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. Men of religion should not influence how people 
vote in elections 
1 2 3 4 
2.  It would be better for my country if more people 
with strong religious beliefs held public office 
1 2 3 4 
3.  Men of religion should have no influence over 
the decisions of government 
1 2 3 4 
4.  Religious practice is a private matter and should 
be separated from socio-political life 
1 2 3 4 
5.  The government and parliament should make 
laws according to the wishes of the people 
1 2 3 4 
6. The government should implement only the laws 
of the Sharia 
1 2 3 4 
7. The government and parliament should make 
laws according to the wishes of the people in 
some areas and implement Sharia in others 
1 2 3 4 
8. If a lottery was available in my country and I  
had the opportunity to participate, I would buy a 
ticket 






3-2) When you consider what a suitable spouse is for your son, daughter, brother, or sister would 










    1. S/he doesn’t pray 
    2. S/he doesn’t fast 
    3. Social status of family 
    4. Poverty 
    5. Lack of education 
    6. Unemployed 
    7. Other (please specify) ______ 




Finally: Information about yourself  
Age:      Gender:   male  female 
Country of Origin: 
Academic Degree:  
Specialization:  
Degree obtained from (country): 
Languages Spoken:  
Average Annual Income:  
 
Have you ever lived in another country?       * Yes                    * No 






1. Everyday or almost everyday 
2. Several times a week 
3. Sometimes 
4. Rarely 
5. Never or almost never 
How often do you read the Quran? 
 
1. Yes, always 
2. Sometimes 
3. No 














2. Somewhat religious 
3. Not religious 





























































































































































































































































































Note: The Arabic is a typed form of the exact words as written by participants. The 
translation is done by the researcher.  
 
 ح ا  اق او	؟ 2.1 ه, +*( )' ا$&"% وا$#"درات ا
2.1 Do you agree with the reform demands and initiatives? 
 
Sample 1: Agree with the reform initiatives: 
ب ا) أ : 
و> أدل B4 , أ@, )="  ه6ا ا<"9%)" دا)? )="ه<=" 	# > 4#ً" أن 6789 )3 ا345#$ "ب أ0/ى و
L5, ا7 و/ آ"ن )/K/دًا $" آ"ن I"=" ه6Hا, ذF )3 ه6ا E ا/ا0' ا$"ش 5K/L M "ً0وا N9و . 
 OP Q9و R S#I ه  ا +#زه" ا$&"% اUUP3 أه5اف و)ا) وا( Nإ %X=L "$( B$	ب أا
9 <=" )="3X أL/0"ء  اX#"ق ا$ 5ًا 34 اY% اL5= وBU#L 9/اآ% روح اY وه6"X9ا %"&( Q
 M ا7ف N/I وإ9$" ا7Mف I/ل اYR[ LI 3L5/ل . ا	ص(وا ( _$XL 3L58ن ا Iأو`_ ا
8@ ذوي اR#ة وا . 
Translation: 
Since our education is bad (word for word = our curriculum is negative), it is not a bad 
idea to borrow from the Western creativity because they are stronger and better than us in 
this domain. Nothing is more evident of this than the situation we are living. Because it is 
the reality, we have no other option. Had we had another option, we would not have been 
like this.  
The West are better than what they (suspicious people) say. The truth that the Western 
demands reveals is that they love doing good and spreading it so we can cope with th
contemporary advances in science and technology and become strong competitors 
without resorting to religious extremism. Religion remains a matter of personal freedom 
undisputed, the dispute is about science. The Prophet (PBUH) made it clear that religion
does not prevent giving credit to those who are better in expertise and knowledge.  
 
Phrases to be coded: 
- Education need reform  
-  Trust in the West (The West is better) 
 
 
Sample 2: Agree with the reform initiatives: 
ب ا) أ : 
Lر"@Pوا =L5ا N$0ء )3 ه6ا ا" وcK "=9 . 8ن ه6ا )#X$أي ا"5Y0 S "=4 ه6ا ا$وع دون ا67 
,eا	م او ا&#' )' ا	Mا B4 ("أو ا  وا	) . ا$وف 5SXLف ا) ا
Yes: because we are part of this world and its religious and civilized values. We have to 
understand the intentions of these projects without falling to the preconceived notions 
that they are targeting the Arab and Muslim nations or conspiring against Islam or 
pushing to normalize with Israel.  
Phrases to be coded: 





Sample 3: Against the Initiatives 
ب ا) ب : 
"HL(M ,$47"`' و ,K 5 إ54ادL+ ا$#"درات Q6ه '$K ن ,"Xا "S+و#Kة وcP$ا "S+"Iو& ,#UL 
No because: All these initiatives want to prepare a generation of traitors to America or 
submissive, a generation that accepts American biased positions and tyrant hegemony.  
Phrases to be coded: 
- Suspicion about the intentions of the initiatives 
 
Sample 4: Against the Initiatives 
ب ا) ب : 
 آ$" +3U9 ?X ه5افن ا 
No because: the intentions are not as pure as they are announced.  
Phrases to be coded: 
- Suspicion of the intentions 
 
Sample 5: Against the Initiatives 
ب ا) ب : 
 ?Xو ن ا$#"درة hح L<% أن +8+ )3 ا75 و+# K"I"ت وأه5اف وI/$g"ت ا$<$' ا
  آ, )" L ه/ 5Sف. "@ورة اه5اف ا5ول اLر"@Pا "=L/ه اد7"ل دو=" و)<$"+=" دوا) ا/$ و+
"=+"$>(  اأ	$" و> "@ورة اح و+=$ . و9 اU او آ, اI/ال iن ا$&"% ا
,g" "SP"ة P+ "=L5"ج K/ا9% ا) و> ا وQ5I()' أ9= أ0 أن آ, , ح ا L5=" ه آ$ L )Iاد 
 . إB إح
No because: initiatives for reform must come from inside and be responsive to the needs, 
goals and aspirations of the Arab societies not to those of the Western countries. All that 
is happening now aims at getting our countries to the maze of globalization, changing our 
cultural identity, spreading the Western capitalist values, not necessarily reforming or 
developing our societies. In any case, the Western demands for reforming our education 
is a “good word for bad cause” (Arabic Idiom), although I confirm that not only 
education, but all aspects of our life needs reform.  
Phrases to be coded: 
- Suspicion of the intentions of the West 
- Reform must come from within 
- Colonial purposes (hegemony) 
- Western programs not compatible with our culture  
 
 
Sample 6: Have a different Opinion  
 : رأي ) ت
 ا UUP U$ا S>أن 9<ب )="ه) اg*"ل ) ا$/اد ا$kS+ل(و"*gض ا"Lم ا</ا9% ) ر	و9#ز  ا
 وآ, )" آ"ن n=4 N و+/5K )5ارس 9"Lد L "ءة	أي إ oو9ك )3 ا$="ه وM )"9' )3 وK/د . ا0$
5ًا 34 اX"ق ا$ YYR( =L5ارس د( . 
I have a different Opinion: We can try their curriculum that is relevant to the scientific 
subjects and early childhood education, and we promote the positive aspects of Islam and 
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leave out from the curriculum any items that offend any other religion, any violence, and 
dedicate schools only for education. There could be religious schools but away from the 
mainstream educational system.  
Phrases to be coded: 
- We need to reform our education 
- The West has strong systems.  
- Only scientific and academic influence from the West 
Sample 7: Have a different Opinion 
 : رأي ) ب
 `"Pا  U&=$ب ا/[ _"Y$  وإ9$" ا	<" ا=q اSK3 > )3 وHب اح و/Kأرى و
,#UX$7 )&(. وا Mو )&( [ ?X ب ح ا , د4/ة ا">Lدة )3 ا</ا9% ا"*	Mا "==H$Lو
"S=( #Xا rور . 
I have a different opinion: I think reform is a must but not from a Western point of view. 
It needs to respond to the interests of the people in the region, current and future interests. 
The Western calls for education reform are not utterly evil or utterly good. We can 
benefit from the positive aspects and reject the negative ones.  
Phrases to be coded: 
- Reform is needed but according to our needs not Western agenda 
- We can use reform initiatives.  
Sample 8: Have a different Opinion 
 : رأي ) ب
 ب Lر"@Pت ا"*Rن ا/$S*L 3L63 ا"M	*"دة )3 ا$3YR ا أرى أن UL/م أP"ب ا$#"درات ا
 ,SXL ا<$' وه6ا "S4 '$>L LL/&+ درات"#( B//ل إ 	وار )' 4$"ء اق ا/I _3 و$X$وا
 .  +=*6ه"
I have a different opinion: I think those who launch the Western initiatives need to 
benefit from the Western specialists who understand the cultural background of Arabs 
and Muslims and open dialogues with the Middle Eastern scholars and Clerics in order to 
formulate developmental initiatives that are receive consensus in the region and will be 
easy to implement.  
Phrases to be coded: 
- Cultural sensitivity 
- We can work together 
Sample 9: Have a different Opinion 
 : رأي ) ب
 "Usا "=L/ه ,L5+ N=( ض8س  ذF أ)" إذا آ"ن ا  إن آ"ن ا&/M">(  L Lت ا$Uرات ا$
M nوأ  S+"وا+<"ه SP"Y( '( %	"=L "$ =L5وا . t$S+5ة وUا %LR+و U&=$ل اIه5اف ه اا
 وا	) اYRا . 
I have a different opinion: If the reforms are to be in the scientific domains, it will be ok. 
But if their purposes are to change our cultural and religious identities in order t  fit them 
with their interests and ideologies, then no and a thousand no (phrase used for emphasis). 
The goals are to colonize the region, to spoil the faith, and to marginalize the Arab and 
Muslim character. 
Phrases to be coded: 
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- Suspicion of the intentions 
- We can work together on science 
- Colonization  
















































































Following is a list of the items used to compute a religious index score for each 
participant.  
A) From Part III in the survey 
Basing important life decisions on religious teachings (From Part III of the survey). 
 
3-2) When you consider what a suitable spouse is for your son, daughter, brother, or 










1. S/he doesn’t 
pray 
1 2 3 4 
2. S/he doesn’t fast 1 2 3 4 
 
B) From Part IV in the survey: 
Score on personal 
religiosity index 
Response Item in the survey 
 






6. Everyday or almost everyday 
7. Several times a week 
8. Sometimes 
9. Rarely 
10. Never or almost never 
How often do you read the 
Quran? 
 




4. Yes, always 
5. Sometimes 
6. No 










5. Somewhat religious 
6. Not religious 
In general, would you 



























































Support for political Islam was measured by a composite score from the following 
statements in Part III in the survey: 
 
The original scores in items 1, 3, 4, 5 were reversed using SPSS because the higher 
scores had to reflect stronger support for political religiosity. The table above shows the 











Support for political Islam 
Statement Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. Men of religion should not influence how people 
vote  in elections 
4 3 2 1 
2.  It would be better for my country if more people 
with  strong religious beliefs held public office 
1 2 3 4 
3.  Men of religion should have no influence over the  
d     …  decisions of government 
4 3 2 1 
4.  Religious practice is a private matter and should be                      
…. separated from socio-political life 
4 3 2 1 
5.  The government and parliament should make laws 
….according to the wishes of the people 
4 3 2 1 
6. The government should implement only the laws of   
the Shari’a 
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